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et al.: Criminal Law

CRIMINAL LAW
I.

A.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Sentencing and Relief
1.

Youthful Offenders

In 1968 the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Youthful
Offender Act,' a law which is nearly identical to the Federal
Youth Corrections Act adopted by Congress in 1952.2 Of critical
importance to the success of the two acts in accomplishing
their intended objectives 3 are their respective sentencing pro1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 55-391 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1973) [hereinafter cited as the

YOA].
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5001-26 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the FYCA].
3. Although the YOA does not specifically set forth its goals, a clear indication of its
intention appears in the definition of "treatment" in § 55-392(e): "'Treatment' means
corrective and preventive guidance and training designed to protect the public by correcting the antisocial tendences of youthful offenders ...

Compare § 55-392(e) with the FYCA at § 5006.
The FYCA has a similar objective which was more fully posited in the legislative
history at 2 U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE 3983-85 (1950):

PURPOSE OF BILL
The proposed legislation is designed to make available for the discretionary
use of the federal judges a system for the sentencing and treatment of persons
under the age of 22 years who have been convicted of crime in the United States
courts that will promote the rehabilitation of those who in the opinion of the
sentencing judge show promise of becoming useful citizens, and so will avoid the
degenerative and needless transformation of many of these young persons into
habitual criminals.
. . . It is believed that by its provision the problem of crime will be met at its
focal point, namely, before the traits of the habitual criminal are allowed to
develop, and that, by permitting the substitution of correctional rehabilitation
for retributive punishment, a substantial contribution will have been made
toward the urgently needed effort to stem and reverse the alarmingly increasing
trend of criminal activity in the United States.
Twenty-one-year-olds offend more frequently than persons of any other age,
22-year-olds come next, and then 23-year-olds.
Sociologists and psychiatrists tell us that special causations which occur in
the period between adolescence and manhood are, in a large measure, responsible for antisocial conduct trends manifested by persons in that age group.
Again, reliable statistics demonstrate, with reasonable certainty, that existing methods of treatment of criminally inclined youths are not solving the problem. A large percentage of those released from our reformatories and penal
institutions return to antisocial conduct and ultimately become hardened criminals.
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visions. 4 In both the state and federal jurisdictions, an often
recurring issue has been whether those provisions require a
sentencing judge, prior to imposing an adult sentence in lieu
of treatment under the Acts, to make an explicit finding that
treatment will be of no benefit to the youthful offender and
to state reasons in the record which support such a findBy herding youth with maturity, the novice with the sophisticate, the impressionable with the hardened, and by subjecting youth offenders to the evil
influences of older criminals and their teaching of criminal techniques, without
the inhibitions that come from normal contacts and counteracting prophylaxis,
many of our penal institutions actively spread the infection of crime and foster,
rather than check, it.
Most of the causes which contribute to antisocial conduct of youth offenders
in the period between adolescence and maturity disappear when the youth
reaches full maturity. The problem is to provide a successful method and means
for treatment of youth men between the ages of 16 and 22 who stand convicted
in our federal courts and are not fit subjects for supervised probation-a method
and means that will effect rehabilitation and restore normality, rather than
develop recidivists.
See also § 5006 of the FYCA.
4. Section 55-395 of the YOA states the following procedure:
In the event of a conviction of a youthful offender the court may:
(a) Suspend the sentence and place the youthful offender on probation.
(b) Release the youthful offender to the custody of the Division prior to
sentencing for an observation and evaluation period of not more than sixty days.
The observation and evaluation will be conducted by the Reception and Evaluation Center operating under joint agreement between the Department of Vocational Rehabilitation and the Department of Corrections and the findings, along
with recommendations for sentencing, shall be returned with the youthful offender to the court for sentencing.
(c) If the offender is under the age of twenty-one, without his consent
sentence the youthful offender indefinitely to the custody of the Department for
treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter until discharged by the
Division, the period of such custody not to be in excess of six years. If the
offender is twenty-one years of age but less than twenty-five years of age he may
be sentenced in accordance with the above procedure if he consents thereto in
writing. No youthful offender shall be sentenced more than twice under the
provisions of this chapter.
(d) If the court shall find that the youthful offender will not derive benefit
from treatment, then the court may sentence the youthful offender under any
other applicable penalty provision. The youthful offender shall be placed in the
custody of the Department.
Section 5010 of the FYCA presents the following very similar procedure:
(a) If the court is of the opinion that the youth offender does not need
commitment, it may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place
the youth offender on probation.
(b) If the court shall find that a convicted person is a youth offender, and
the offense is punishable by imprisonment under applicable provisions of law
other than this subsection, the court may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment
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ingA The South Carolina Supreme Court has uniformly refused
to impose either requirement upon trial judges. The federal
appellate courts, however, have reached diverse results on the
issue.7
otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the
Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter until
discharged by the Division as provided in section 5017(c) of this chapter; or
(c) If the court shall find that the youth offender may not be able to derive
maximum benefit from treatment by the Division prior to the expiration of six
years from the date of conviction it may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment
otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the
Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter for any
further period that may be authorized by law for the offense or offenses of which
he stands convicted or until discharged by the Division as provided in section
5017(d) of this chapter.
(d) If the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit
from treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence the
youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision.
(e) If the court desires additional information as to whether a youth offender will derive benefit from treatment under subsections (b) or (c) it may
order that he be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for observation and study at an appropriate classification center or agency. Within sixty
days from the date of the order, or such additional period as the court may grant,
the Division shall report to the court its findings.
5. As to the requirements of the YOA, see, e.g., Creel v. State, 262 S.C. 558, 206
S.E.2d 825 (1974); Powell v. State, 262 S.C. 592, 206 S.E.2d 883 (1974); Hering v. State,
262 S.C. 597, 206 S.E.2d 885 (1974); Bethea v. State, 262 S.C. 255, 204 S.E.2d 12 (1974);
Ballard v. State, 258 S.C. 91, 187 S.E.2d 224 (1972).
For interpretation of the FYCA's requirements, see, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 497
F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Kaylor, 491 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc);
United States v. Schenker, 486 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Dorszynski, 484
F.2d 849 (7th Cir.), rev'd in part, 418 U.S. 424 (1974); United States v. Coefield, 476 F.2d
1152 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc); Williams v. United States, 476 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1973);
Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1973) (en banc); United States v. Jaratt, 471
F.2d 226 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969 (1973); Rogers v. United States, 326 F.2d
56 (10th Cir. 1963).
6. See cases collected at note 5 supra. Nonetheless, the court has stated that the
better practice would be to make such an explicit finding and to substantiate it on the
record. Powell v. State, 262 S.C. at 597, 206 S.E.2d at 885. Currently, the court regards
the fact that a youth has been sentenced as an adult to be an implicit finding. See note 5
supra.
7. Only the Seventh Circuit would allow application of the FYCA in a manner similar
to that employed by the South Carolina Supreme Court. See text accompanying note 10
infra. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have stated that there were no objections to implicit
findings per se, but each court remanded its respective case to the lower courts for explicit
findings. See cases cited at note 5 supra. Ostensibly, the reason those cases were remanded
for specific findings was the difficulty in determining when a finding is sufficiently implicit to comport with legislative intent. Accord, Brooks v. United States, 497 F.2d 1059,
1062 (6th Cir. 1974). The Third and Tenth Circuits, however, require an explicit finding
but stop short of insisting upon substantiation. Williams v. United States, 476 F.2d 970
(3d Cir. 1973); Rogers v. United States, 326 F.2d 56 (10th Cir. 1963). The Second, Sixth,
and District of Columbia Circuits insist upon both requirements. See cases cited at note
Published
by Scholar Commons, 1975
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In June 1974, the federal rift was closed in Dorszynski v.
United States,8 where the Supreme Court,' in a less-thanpersuasive opinion, held that the FYCA did require sentencing
judges to make an explicit finding of no benefit but declined to
impose the requirement that such a finding be supported in the
record by a statement of reasons therefor. Not only did the majority fail to offer a compelling rationale for its decision, it also failed
to note that established rules of statutory construction may suggest a different resolution of the "statement of reasons" issue.
Since the Fourth Circuit and the South Carolina District
Courts are now presumably governed by Dorszynski in their application of the FYCA, efforts here will turn initially to a critical
analysis of that opinion. Notwithstanding the result of that
analysis, it will then be argued that because of language differences between the federal and state Acts, the South Carolina
Supreme Court, even under the Dorszynski rationale, may wish
to retreat from its present stand and to insist upon compliance
with both requirements?
a.

Youthful Offenders in Federal Courts

In Dorszynski the petitioner alleged that the District Court
had been without jurisdiction to impose an adult sentence because it had failed to make an explicit finding, rationally
substantiated, under the FYCA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed
petitioner's sentence, holding that the requisite finding could be
implied from the imposition of an adult sentence. 0 The United
States Supreme Court held that an explicit finding was required
8. 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
9. See text accompanying note 6 supra. In Nolan v. Daley, 222 S.C. 407, 412, 73
S.E.2d 449, 451 (1952), the supreme court postulated the following rule of construction:
While this Court is in no sense bound by the construction of similar acts by the
courts of another Ojurisdiction], we may well be moved to adopt the construction by such courts when we are impressed by the logic and reasonableness of
their conclusions . ...
Thus, if the Dorszynski majority's conclusion that the FYCA was merely an alternative,
as opposed to a preferred, sentencing procedure is erroneous or if the South Carolina
Supreme Court concludes that, in any event, the YOA was intended by the Legislature
to be the preferred procedure for youthful offenders, it may desire to follow the interpretations and procedures recommended by the Dorszynski dissenters and the Second, Sixth,
and District of Columbia Circuits. For a discussion of the alternative-preferred dichotomy
see text accompanying notes 12-21 infra; for the view of the Dorszynski minority see 418
U.S. at 445-60 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment); for the views of the circuit courts
see cases cited note 5 supra.
10. 484 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973).
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and reversed and remanded for such a finding;" it interpreted the
FYCA, however, as not requiring a statement of reasons supportive of the finding. The Court voted unanimously for reversing
and remanding for the explicit finding but split five to four on the
issue of whether that finding had to be substantiated by reasons
in the record.
The disagreement among the Justices as to the second requirement was based upon differing interpretations of the legislative intent. The Burger majority argued that commentary from
both the drafters and the legislators was unanimous in establishing the FYCA only as an alternative sentencing arrangement,
designed solely to broaden the range of sentences available to a
trial judge." Sentencing under the Act could be accepted or rejected "purely" at the option of the judge.13 The Court stated that
a judge need only demonstrate his awareness of both the FYCA
and its applicability to a particular youth. These were the sole
purposes of the no benefit finding." The majority based its refusal
to accord preferredprocedural status to the FYCA (thereby recognizing the Act as only a totally discretionary alternate procedure
which may be used by a court) on its inability to find clear congressional intent to depart from the "well-established" doctrine
of unfettered judicial discretion in sentencing;' 5 the court reasoned that once a trial judge had established an awareness of the
alternate procedure, the availability of review would end and
with it the need for a statement of reasons.' 6
The minority found, through a logical and more persuasive
interpretation17 of the Act's legislative history, what it considered
11. 418 U.S. 424 (1974) (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 438.
14. Id. at 443.
15. Id. at 441. It is interesting to note that in so holding, the Court, in effect, established separate standards for reviewing discretionary rulings of sentencing judges and
administrative officers. To be sure, administrative proceedings are to be differentiated
from adjudicative proceedings; however, it would seem that a sentencing hearing would
more closely resemble the former in that, like an agency hearing, a sentencing is an
attempt to predict the viability of a particular course of action. Whereas judicial review
of an administrative determination is authorized unless that determination is expressly
committed solely to agency discretion by law or unless there is no law to apply (see
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1970)), sentencing powers
of judges are presumed to be unlimited within the statutory maximums.
16. 418 U.S. at 443-44. In the majority's view, the only purpose for requiring the
statement of reasons would be to provide a basis upon the record for appellate review. Id.
at 441-42. But see note 60 infra.
17. The majority based its decision on the preferred-alternative dichotomy almost
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to be a clear expression of congressional intent that the FYCA be
the preferred procedure.' 8 In according the Act a preferred status,
the minority view would necessarily breathe life into judicial review, in that a decision to forego the FYCA's preferred provisions
would by implication arouse suspicion of discretionary abuse.' 9
Moreover, without a statement of the reasons underlying the finding, the explicit finding would be rendered valueless"0 and appel2
late review, impossible. '
Regardless of the merit of either side's arguments, what was
conspicuous in both the majority and minority opinions was that
very little consideration was devoted to the actual language of the
FYCA. 22 Such laxity in construction is unfortunate and remarkable, especially in view of the fact that since 1804 the Court has
''
recognized that "[a] statute is the best expositor of itself. 3
Careful perusal of the construction and use of certain other
wording within section 5010(d) 24 might well lead one to conclude
that the intent of Congress was to confer preferred status upon
the FYCA; although adequately briefed by counsel for both sides,
the issue was ignored by the majority. 25 Of far more importance,
entirely upon testimony presented at hearings and earlier committee reports; the minority, however, relied to a much greater extent upon H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1949). That report was the latest expression of congressional intent and accompanied the
FYCA in the year of its passage, 1952, as its legislation history. See 2 U.S. CODE & CONG.
SERVIcE 3983 (1950). Moreover, aside from the comments of one of the bill's sponsors,
testimony relied upon by the majority was from sources one might expect to have a bias
in favor of the interpretation adopted by the court-five judges, the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons, and the Justice Department. See 418 U.S. at 436-40.
18. 418 U.S. at 445-60.
19. See id. at 451-53; cf. id. at 441-44.
20. Id. at 452-54.
21. Id. at 454.
22. At one point in his opinion Justice Marshall notes that a "mere parroting of the
statutory language is hardly an affirmative finding," because, as he sees it, the majority's
opinion does not require a judge to "actually find no benefit." Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
At another point he notes the mandatory connotation of the words "shall find." Id. at 459.
The majority, after describing other provisions of the Act, leaves the gate in its discussion
of the adult sentencing provision (§ 5010(d)) by kicking up clods of legislative history and
finishes without ever having analyzed the words of the statute.
23. Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. 33, 52 (1804) (Marshall, C.J., for the majority).
24. See note 4 supra.Words such as "if the court shall find. . . then the court may
sentence" in section 5010(d) seem to support a legislative intent to confer preferred status
on the Act.
25. Brief for National Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n and National Prison Project of the
Am. Civil Liberties Union Foundation as Amici Curiae at 4; Brief for Respondent at 3235. The respondent, however, experienced difficulty in discounting the mandatory nature
of the word "shall," concluding simply that the meaning was not clear. Id. at 35.
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however, is the fact that the parties, the amicus curiae, and the
Court never considered why the statute required a finding of no
benefit.
If the majority was correct in concluding that the requirement of an explicit finding was designed only to demonstrate a
judge's awareness of the Act's existence and applicability, then
there could be no reason behind the explicit congressional attachment of a quantitative tag-a no benefit determination-to the
finding. Under the Court's interpretation of legislative intent, a
judge could conclude that FYCA treatment would be of benefit
and yet refuse to prescribe such treatment just the same. Such a
result would stultify the congressional requirement that the possi26
bility of benefit be appraised.
Rather than analyzing the controversial areas of statutory
construction, it is suggested only that although the majority's
holding is not unsupported by principles of construction, 7 other
principles28 which suggest that a statement of reasons be required,
26. Conceivably, a judge might operate under the opinion that retributive punishment might always be of more value than rehabilitative treatment. The Court notes
favorably the testimony of Judge Bolitha J. Laws, who stated that "this law is purely an
optional situation. A Judge who feels that the present system is in all respects perfect and
who does not want to use the new provisions. . . does not have to use them." 418 U.S. at
438 n.12 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). For Judge Law's, and thus for the majority's, views to be construed as capturing congressional intent, however, it must be presumed that Congress did not consider the FYCA to be the better treatment for youthful
offenders, that the FYCA, in other words, was purely a shot in the dark at providing a
more effective treatment method and was unsupported by congressional belief that it
actually would be better than existing methods. Thus, the only way to provide a meaning
or use to the requirement of a no benefit finding under the Dorszynski majority's holding
would be to presume that Congress intended to allow the courts to make a per se evaluation of the program. The majority, however, noted that the " Act was . . . designed to
provide a better method for treating young offenders . . . ." 418 U.S. at 433 (emphasis
added). To admit that FYCA treatment was believed to be better should lead to the
conclusion that per se judicial evaluation of the system of treatment was precluded, see
note 28 infra, and that judges would be required to evaluate treatment ad hoc in terms of
the particular youth to be sentenced. Only if the judge finds that a youth will not derive
benefit under the Act could he sentence that youth as an adult without rendering the
requirement of finding no benefit useless.
27. A court is obliged, insofar as possible, to construe a statute in line with legislative
intent. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). Moreover, it is not lightly
to be presumed that Congress, in enacting the FYCA, intended to depart from the longestablished rule of judicial discretion in sentencing. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 416 (1968); Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 627 (1925). See
also note 26 supra.
28. It is a court's duty "to give effect if possible, to every clause and word of a statute;
rather than to emasculate an entire section . . . ." United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S.
528, 538-39 (1955) (citation omitted). Nor may Congress be presumed to have adopted
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should be accorded more weight in the interpretation of the
FYCA's requirements. Because the majority decision would most
probably negate the purpose of the law,'2 because congressional
testimony relied upon by the majority in ascertaining legislative
intent notably lacked statements by legislators and emphasized
opinions expectedly biased," and because, in light of the first two
reasons, the minority's reading of intent is the more rational,' it
is the conclusion of this author that proper consideration of the
arguments concerning the FYCA's language should lead the
Court to retreat from its present stand and to require articulation
in the record of reasons for a no benefit finding whenever such a
finding is rendered by a sentencing judge.
b.

Youthful Offenders in State Courts

Whether the reader chooses to accept the argument above or
to side with the Dorszynski majority, he nonetheless should conclude that the South Carolina Youthful Offender Act requires
both an explicit finding and a statement of reasons. The linchpin
of the Burger majority's argument" is inefficacious to application
of the YOA; legislative intent to limit sentencing discretion, as
shall be demonstrated, clearly appears in the wording of the Act. 3
The South Carolina Supreme Court reiterated its construcmeaningless or useless legislation. United States v. Howell, 78 U.S. 432, 436 (1870). Finally, courts should refrain from substituting their judgment as to the wisdom or necessity
of particular legislation for that of the legislature. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S.
575, 580 (1911).
29. The Supreme Court has stated that "even the most basic principles of statutory
construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent." National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 415 U.S. 453, rehearingdenied, 415
U.S. 952 (1974). The real purpose of the FYCA is not to broaden the sentencing powers of
trial judges, but rather it is to provide a better method of treatment for youthful offenders.
The legislative history is replete with references to the inadequacy of present sentencing
procedures in preventing recidivism and states that the cure will result from the new
method of treatment and not from the mere fact that sentencing discretion has been
broadened. See note 3 supra. Such a view of the purpose of the Act erases the conflict
envisioned by the majority between legislative intent and the need for substantiating the
finding. Accomplishment of that purpose should not be permitted to depend upon judicial
evaluation of the FYCA's wisdom and necessity. See note 26 supra; see also New York
State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 419 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1973), where the Supreme
Court proclaimed, "We cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated purposes."
30. See note 17 supra.
31. See 418 U.S. at 445-52.
32. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
33. See text accompanying notes 45-53 infra.
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tion 34 of the YOA's requirements at least four times in 1974. 31 The
case of Creel v. State,3' however, best illuminates the inequities
which can result from such an interpretation. The defendant, who
was then 21 years old, pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter
and was sentenced as an adult to 15 years. The sentencing record
reflects that on the date of the homicide the defendant was situated in the back of a small grocery store with several of his
friends.3 7 The victim entered and immediately initiated an altercation with the defendant. It was uncontroverted that the defendant initially attempted to avoid any sort of physical confrontation.3 After continued provocation, the defendent lunged at the
deceased and during the ensuing scuffle stabbed him twenty-four
times. The record also reflects that the defendant had no police
record, that he had been gainfully employed at the same
job for eight months, 39 and that at all times he was "very
cooperative"4 0 with the authorities. It further appears that one of
the arresting officers, when questioned about the victim's reputation for violence, stated that he loved to fight when he was drinking,4 it having also been adduced that the victim drank "often." 4 2
At no time during the sentencing hearing did the trial judge refer
to the Youthful Offender Act, state an opinion one way or the
other as to whether the defendant would benefit from youthful
offender treatment, or in any other way directly intimate that he
had considered sentencing under the Act. Finally, it appears that
the number of times that the victim was stabbed was the judge's
overriding consideration in passing sentence. 3 In affirming the
sentence, the supreme court found it evident from the following
statement that the trial judge had made an implicit finding that
the defendant would derive no benefit from youthful offender
treatment: "I am going to take into consideration . . . [t]he fact
that he has no record, that he is twenty-one years of age, but I
am still going to give him something commensurate with the
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See note 6 supra.
See note 5 supra.
262 S.C. 558, 206 S.E.2d 825 (1974).
Record at 20, 23.
Id. at 27, 33, 36.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25.

42. Id.
43. Id. at 39-40.
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crime that he committed."44
In view of the expressed intention in the YOA to limit sentencing discretion, even the Dorszynski majority could be expected to shy away from such a result. The first limitation on
judicial use of the Act appears in section 55-392(f) which specifically precludes a sentencing judge from imposing treatment in
any case "in which the maximum punishment provided by law
is death or life imprisonment." No such limitation appears in the
FYCA.45
Secondly, section 55-395(d) provides, "If the court shall find
that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment
under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence the
45.
youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision."
Use of the word "the" before youth offender should imply ad hoc
estimation of the YOA's efficacy in regard to the youth to be
sentenced." Moreover, the word "shall" appearing in a statute is
usually mandatory in nature, "and the context ought to be very
strongly persuasive before the word is softened into mere
permission." Since the words "shall" and "may" are both used
in section 55-395 (a)(2), the no benefit finding should be read to
be a condition precedent to permission to impose an adult sentence.48 Moreover, this interpretation is clear from the use of the
words "if" and "then." "If" sets up the condition, and "then"
connotes "at the time of" or "not prior to" fulfillment of the
condition.
Third, section 55-395(c) expressly limits sentencing discre44. 262 S.C. at 564, 206 S.E.2d at 828. It should be noted that the Legislature precluded application of the YOA only upon conviction for an offense which carries the death
penalty or life imprisonment. S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-392(f) (Cum. Supp. 1973). Moreover,
assuming arguendo that a statement of reasons, along with the explicit finding, is required
under the YOA, the views of those federal courts adhering to such requirements should
be accorded relevancy. See note 9 supra. The Second Circuit specifically considered the
relevancy of the seriousness of the offense to the applicability of the FYCA and concluded:
"Nowhere is there any indication that the type of crime committed, [and] elements...

of violence involved therein, . . are to be considered per se to require denial of treatment
under the Act." United States v. Kaylor, 491 F.2d 1133, 1137 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc).

45. See 18 U.S.C. § 5006(h) (1970).
45.1 S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-395(d) (Cum. Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
46. See note 26 supra.
47. Spivey v. Mason, 186 S.E.2d 154, 155 (Ga. App. 1971) (citation omitted); see also
Schmidt v. City of Richmond, 206 Va. 211, 142 S.E.2d 573 (1965); Terry v. Sencindiver,

171 S.E.2d 480 (W. Va. 1969).
48. See United States v. Dorszynski, 418 U.S. at 449 (Marshall, J., concurring in the

judgment).
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tion by mandating that "[n]o youthful offender shall be sentenced more than twice under the provisions of this chapter." No
similar limitation appears in the parallel federal provisions. 9
Finally, section 55-400.6, entitled "Certain powers of courts
not affected," reads, "Nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect
the power of any court to suspend the imposition or execution of
any sentence and place a youthful offender on probation." The
title or caption of an act may be construed by the court in order
to determine legislative intent.5" "Certain" is a word of limitation
and as such connotes that the only sentencing powers unaffected
by chapter 8.1, the YOA, are the powers to suspend sentence and
to grant probation. The relevant rule of construction is expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, or the express mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of the other.51 Under the rule, then, the
power of judges to choose between adult and YOA sentences must
be viewed as circumscribed by the limitations in section 55392(f), (certain offenses), section 55-395(c) (two-time offenders
and treatment depending upon age), and section 55-395(d) (the

no benefit finding) .52
In view of the above limitations, it is not possible to say, as
it was in Dorszynski, that the Legislature merely intended to
provide an alternatesentencing arrangement. The wording of section 55-400.6 itself stands as a clear indication that sentencing
powers over youthful offenders have been altered except for those
53
enumerated therein.
Had the Dorszynski court found similar indications of legislative intent, it probably would have had "to subject the sentence
to appellate review . . . , thereby limiting the sentencing court's
discretion."54 Having made review available, the court would also
need to provide some basis upon which appellate scrutiny could
proceed-i.e., a statement of reasons substantiating the finding
of no benefit.55 The solace derived by the United States Supreme
Court from Congress' failure to expressly provide for a statement
49. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3010(b), (c) (1970).
50. State ex rel. McLeod v. Montgomery, 244 S.C. 308, 136 S.E.2d 778 (1964).
51. See Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. City of Spartanburg, 185 S.C. 313, 194 S.E.
139 (1937).
52. See note 4 and text accompanying note 45 supra.
53. Compare Dorszynski, 418 U.S. at 439-40.
54. Id. at 441.
55. Id. at 441-42.
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of reasons 5 should not be shared by the South Carolina Supreme
Court from the Legislature's similar omission." Acceptance of the
fact that the Legislature has conferred preferred status upon the
YOA's sentencing provisions implies the need for the statement;5 8
an omission in such circumstances, therefore, can hardly be attributed the magnitude of an omission from an alternatesentencing procedure.
Even though the South Carolina Supreme Court has admitted that the better practice would be to include explicit findings
and a statement of reasons, 5 its reluctance to insert itself into the
legislative province is understandable. By requiring the two procedural safeguards, however, the court would not be usurping the
legislative function; rather it would be providing a comprehensive
prophylactic procedure capable of insuring effective administration of the YOA in line with the purposes for which it was created. 0
2.

Credit for Time Spent

a. FightingExtradition not on Escape
In State v. Dozier" the defendant was convicted of assault
and battery with intent to kill, carrying an unlawful weapon,
housebreaking and grand larceny. Prior to trial but subsequent
56. Id. at 442 n.15.
57. But see Powell v. State, 262 S.C. 592, 596, 206 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1974).
58. See 418 U.S. at 441-42.
59. The court has not stated why it felt that such a conclusion could not be attributed
to the Legislature as well.
60. In his consideration of the FYCA, Justice Marshall cogently revealed several
other ways in which the requirements could aid in achieving the statutory goal of rehabilitation:
First, it might well contribute to rationalizing the sentencing process and to
decreasing disparities in sentences.
[Second] the reasons may also be of value to correctional authorities in the
handling of the prisoner after sentence.
[Third, a] disclosure of reasons may also aid the defendant's counsel to insure
that the sentence is not premised on misinformation or inaccuracies in the
material upon which the sentencing Judge relies.
[Fourth,] an articulation of reasons may actually contribute to the offender's
rehabilitation by avoiding any feeling that his sentence was arbitrary.
418 U.S. at 455-59 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
61. 263 S.C. 267, 210 S.E.2d 225 (1974).
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to the offense, he was arrested in Georgia upon charges for which
he was later cleared. Prior to his exoneration in Georgia, a South
Carolina detainer was placed against him. For a period of 244
days the defendant fought extradition, remaining in confinement
for the entire period because of his inability to obtain bond. After
losing his extradition fight and upon sentencing by a South Carolina Court after trial, he applied for credit for the pre-sentence
time he had spent in both the Georgia and South Carolina jails.
The trial judge credited him with time spent in the South Carolina jails but denied credit for the time spent in Georgia. The
defendant appealed on the ground that the trial court had erred
in not granting him full credit for the time spent in the Georgia
jail.
The majority opinion, while noting that formerly the issue of
credit for time spent was discretionary with the trial judge,"2 recognized that amended section 55-11 of the South Carolina Code
of Laws 3 made that issue a qualified matter of right. Thus, the
question became whether credit for time spent in out-of-state
jails was properly encompassed by the Act. Concluding that it
was, the supreme court ordered that the defendant be credited for
so much of the time he had spent in the Georgia jail after enactment of the amendment. 4 Judge Brailsford dissented from that
portion of the majority opinion which denied credit for time spent
in the Georgia jail prior to enactment of the new provision. In his
view, whether the Act was to modify a particular sentence depended solely on the date of sentencing-so that if the defendant
62. See State v. Sanders, 251 S.C. 431, 163 S.E.2d 220 (1968).
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-11 (Cum. Supp. 1974):
The computation of the time served by prisoners under sentences imposed by
the courts of this State shall be reckoned from the date of the imposition of the
sentence. But when (a) a prisoner shall have given notice of intention to appeal,
(b) the commencement of the service of the sentence follows the revocation of
probation or (c) the court shall have designated a specific time for the commencement of the service of the sentence, the computation of the time served
shall be reckoned from the date of the commencement of the service of the
sentence. In every case in computing the time served by a prisoner, full credit
against the sentence shall be given for time served prior to trial and sentencing.
Provided, however, that credit for time served prior to trial and sentencing shall
not be given: (1) when the prisoner at the time he was imprisoned prior to trial
was an escapee from another penal institution; or (2) when the prisoner is
serving a sentence for one offense and is awaiting trial and sentence for a second
offense in which case he shall not receive credit for time served prior to trial in
a reduction of his sentence for the second offense.
64. 263 S.C. at 273-74, 210 S.E.2d at 227.
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had been sentenced prior to the effective date, credit for time
spent would be discretionary; if after that date, credit would be
mandatory. The dates of the pretrial confinement were irrelevant."
b. Fighting Extraditionafter an Escape
In Oglesby v. Leekel6 the defendant, while serving a 3-year
sentence for housebreaking and larceny, escaped and fled to New
York. While in that state, he committed another crime for which
he was incarcerated. The State of South Carolina filed a detainer
against him, requesting that he be held for return upon completion of his sentence. After completion of his New York sentence,
he remained incarcerated while unsuccessfully fighting extradition, and subsequently was returned to South Carolina where he
pleaded guilty to the charge of escape. At his sentencing he
argued, inter alia, that "he should be given credit for the period
of time between the completion of his New York sentence and his
return to South Carolina
67
dited."

. .

. during which he was being extra-

The lower court held that the defendant was entitled neither
to credit against his original sentence nor to credit against the
sentence imposed upon the charge of escape. In affirming, the
supreme court held that the defendant was not entitled to credit
on the original sentence because
[u]nder the present facts, the escape of the defendant tolled
the running of [that sentence] and the time of his imprisonment [thereunder] did not begin to run until his return to the
South Carolina prison ....

68

65. Id. at 275, 210 S.E.2d at 228. Justice Bussey concurred in Justice Brailsford's

dissent. In any event it seems clear that regardless of when the statute was enacted,
defendant had a constitutional right to credit for the full 244 days. See text accompanying
notes 66-73 infra.
66. 263 S.C. 283, 210 S.E.2d 232 (1974).
67. Id. at 286, 210 S.E.2d at 233.
68. Id. at 287, 210 S.E.2d at 234. The authority cited by the court, however, does not
support its conclusion. For instance, citation to 21 Am. JUR. 2d CriminalLaw § 445 lends
superficial support to the court's conclusion by stating that "a sentence of imprisonment
is satisfied only by actual imprisonment [and that] if a convict escapes .

. . ,

he is not

entitled to credit on his sentence for the time of his absence." Deeper investigation,
however, would have revealed a case in the 1974 annual cumulative supplement of that
authority where the word "absence" is interpreted to mean "absence from custody on the
charge on which he escaped." See Jennings v. Hunt, 272 So. 2d 233 (La. 1973). 24B CJS
Criminal Law § 1995(7) similarly fails to provide the needed support. That section, enti-
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Nor could the defendant be credited on his sentence for the escape. The court concluded:
[Section 55-11] was clearly not intended to afford credit for the
time a prisoner was out of jail during an escape; and also excludes credit for the time appellant served immediately prior to
his sentence for escape, since he was then serving a sentence and
awaiting trial for a second offense (escape)."
The conclusion that defendant was not entitled to time spent
while out of jail on escape is not open to argument. The court,
however, presents a clearly circular argument by refusing to grant
defendant credit on his original sentence and by then asserting
that time spent fighting extradition cannot be credited against
the sentence for escape because he was then serving a sentence
for the original offense. Clearly, if he was serving the original
sentence during the time he was being detained in New York
while fighting extradition, then he should have been credited for
it. It follows that if he was not serving the original sentence during
the extradition fight, he was entitled to credit on the escape sentence under section 55-11.
The above conclusions are not only warranted by logical construction of section 55-11 but are federal constitutional requirements mandated by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The
United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Benz7 that
once sentence is imposed it may not thereafter be increased without subjecting a "defendant to double punishment for the same
offense in violation of the fifth amendment. . . ."I' Thus, should

defendant have been considered to be serving sentence while in
custody fighting extradition, failure to credit him for time so
spent would constitute an unlawful increase in his punishment.
On the other hand, if the defendant's extradition time is viewed
tled Time at Liberty Generally,requires "actual imprisonment" and forbids credit "where
a prisoner has not suffered punishment during such time." Purported case authority cited
by the court is similarly unpersuasive. Phillips v. Dutton, 378 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1967)
involved a claim by a Georgia prisoner who asked for credit for the time spent during his
freedom after escape and for credit for time spent during the serving of his sentence in
Florida on a separate charge. Vaughn v. Virginia, 307 F. Supp. 688, 690 (W.D. Va.1969),
stands for the logical proposition that a parole board need not "credit time served by
petitioner in another state, for another crime, against the unserved portion of his Virginia
sentence."
69. 263 S.C. at 288, 210 S.E.2d at 234 (emphasis added). See also note 63 supra.
70. 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
71. Id. at 307.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1975

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

purely as time spent in custody awaiting trial on the escape
charge, then the failure to grant credit for that time against any
sentence imposed for the escape would clearly contravene the
dictates of Mohr v. Jordon,7 2 where the Fourth Circuit upheld the
district court's finding that "time spent in custody awaiting trial
must be credited toward . . . the sentence imposed ... ,
3.

Guilty Pleas

Alien74

In State v.
the defendant pleaded guilty to the charge
while under the influence of drugs. 75
vehicle
of operating a motor
On appeal, he argued that he should be permitted to withdraw
his guilty plea because, inter alia, the trial judge erred, as a
matter of law, in not ascertaining whether there was a factual
basis sufficient to support the charge. In answer to defendant's
contention, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded:
There is no merit in this position. Where a defendant voluntarily, intelligently, and understandingly enters a plea of guilty,
this makes it unnecessary for the State to offer evidence to prove
the offense charged in the warrant or indictment.78
Unfortunately, the court's holding apparently ignores one of the
basic purposes underlying ascertainment of a factual basis and
the constitutional mandate of North Carolina v. Alford 71 that
such a basis be ascertained.
As important to the requirement as the purpose of insuring
that a plea be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent is the collateral
goal of protecting the innocent. 78 This is no more than to say that
a judge is responsible for the proper administration of justice,
which includes, presumably, insuring that innocent people do not
go to jail. Several recurring guilty plea situations point to the
need for requiring ascertainment of a strong factual basis. For
instance, it is now clear that a plea of guilty need not be an
72. 370 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Md. 1972), af'd, No. 74-1496 (4th Cir., June 10, 1974).

73. Id.
74. 261 S.C. 448, 200 S.E.2d 684 (1974).
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-343 (Cum. Supp. 1974): "It is unlawful for any person...
who is under the influence of. . .narcotic drugs, barbiturates, paraldehydes, or drugs,

herbs, or any other substance of like character, whether synthetic or natural, to drive any
vehicle within this state."
76. 261 S.C. at 451, 200 S.E.2d at 685-86.
77. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
78. Id. at 38 n.10.
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admission of guilt in order to be accepted. 9 When such pleas,
accompanied by protestations of innocence, are tendered, it becomes incumbent upon the trial judge to determine that the defendant has "intelligently [concluded] that his interests require
entry of a guilty plea and' [that] the record. . . contains strong
evidence of actual guilt." 0 Other obvious situations in which a
factual basis should be ascertained occur when a defendant cannot recall the transaction for which he is charged and when he
81
pleads guilty to protect another.
Moreover, it is well-settled that a judge, in the absence of law
to the contrary and when justice may so require, is empowered
to refuse to accept a guilty plea.8 2 In fact, it would seem that
where there is a serious question as to the viability of the state's
case, he should be under compulsion to exercise that power.13 The
South Carolina rule adopted in Allen, rather than promoting justice, seemingly enhances the likelihood that the crucial determination will not be made, thereby increasing the possibility of
unjust incarceration.
Fortunately, the rule seems destined to an early death. At
least one federal appellate court has interpreted Alford as standing for the proposition that ascertainment of a factual basis is a
constitutional prerequisite to the proper acceptance of a guilty
plea."
79. Id. at 37-38.
80. Id. at 37 (emphasis added). The South Carolina Supreme Court seems to ignore
the possibility that a plea need not necessarily be an admission of guilt. In Allen the court
stated that a "plea of guilty is an admission or confession of guilt . . . ; it admits all
matter of fact averments of the accusation." 261 S.C. at 461, 200 S.E.2d at 685.
81. See ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standards Relating to Guilty Pleas § 1.6 and Commentary (approved Draft 1968).
82. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962).
83. Logically, if the judge does not attempt to make the necessary finding, an evaluation of the case against a defendant could not be made.
84. United States ex rel. Dunn v. Cassacles, 494 F.2d 397, 399-400 (2d Cir. 1974). The
possibility exists that Allen may be read not to preclude the requirement of ascertaining
a factual basis but only to preclude the requirement that the state must always offer
evidence to prove the offense charged. Such an interpretation would be preferable in light
of the discussion above and, in fact, would comport with most readings of the requirement.
For example, the Second Circuit recently observed that "[it is undeniably true that [a]
court, in determining whether there [is] a factual basis for [a] plea, [is] free to rely on
any facts at its disposal," including admissions of the defendant, statements from the
attorney for the government, pre-sentence reports, and others. Irizarry v. United States,
508 F.2d 960, 967 (1974).
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The Right to an Appeal

In White v. State 5 one of the anomalies of the American
system of justice was brought to light. Although the right to an
appeal is not constitutionally mandated,"6 South Carolina, as all
other jurisdictions in the United States, 7 has provided criminal
defendants with the means to appeal their convictions and sentences. The South Carolina statute8 8 granting the right to an appeal is limited by a notice provision 9 with which the failure to
comply constitutes waiver of the right regardless of the reason for
the noncompliance." In White the defendant was held to have
waived his right to an appeal in spite of the fact that he may have
been unaware both of that right and of the means by which it may
1 the Fourth Circuit
have been asserted. In Nelson v. Peyton,"

provided a conduit by which the harshness of such a result was
to be avoided, and by failing to follow the Nelson rule the South
Carolina Supreme Court may have obviated the need, in White85. 263 S.C. 110, 208 S.E.2d 35 (1974).
86. "A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case ... is
not now a necessary element of due process of law." McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684,
687 (1894). See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
87. Note, Failure to File Timely Notice of Appeal in Criminal Cases: Excusable

Neglect, 41 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 73, 78 (1965) [hereinafter cited as NOTRE DAME LAWYER].
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-401 (1962): "An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court
in the cases mentioned in §§ 15-122 and 15-123."
89. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-405 (1962) provides in pertinent part:
In every appeal to the Supreme Court from an order, decree or judgment granted
or rendered at chambers from which an appeal may be taken to the Supreme
Court, the appellant or his attorney shall, within ten days after receiving written
notice that the order has been granted or the decree or judgment rendered, give
notice to the opposite party or his attorney of his intention to appeal; and in all
other appeals to the Supreme Court, the appellant or his attorney shall, within
ten days after the rising of the circuit court, give like notice of his intention to
appeal to the opposite party or his attorney.
90. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-410 (1962) is the only provision permitting time extensions
in the appeals procedure. It does not provide an extension of the time requirements for
noting an appeal:
The time for taking any step or proceeding in the preparation and perfection of
an appeal from a circuit court to the Supreme Court, as now prescribed by law,
except the time of giving notice of appeal to the oppositeparty, may be extended
by the judge who heard the cause or by any one of the justices of the Supreme
Court, upon four days' notice of such motion being first given to the opposite
party. (emphasis added).
See also State v. Wright, 228 S.C. 432, 90 S.E.2d 492 (1955); Stroup v. Duke Power Co.,
216 S.C. 79, 56 S.E.2d 745 (1949); Renneker v. Waren, 20 V.C. 581 (1884).
91. 415 F.2d 1154 (1969).
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type situations, for criminal defendants first to exhaust their
state remedies before applying for federal habeas relief.
The requirement that notice of intention to appeal must be
given within a statutorily prescribed time is founded upon "the
practical and . . important interest in securing a termination
of the litigation"9 2 and upon the fact that "[1]engthy delays,
which hamper an adequate review, also erode the efficacy and the
desired goals of our criminal administration."93 Proponents of
flexibility in the notice requirement maintain that rigid enforcement does not reflect "society's reluctance to allow the liberty or
the life of the accused to be determined in a single, fallible proceeding"94 nor its hesitancy "to impose the severe punishment of
imprisonment or death until [it is] reasonably certain that the
conviction is not erroneous.""g
6 the United States Supreme
In United States v. Robinson,"
Court recognized the weighty policy arguments on both sides of
the issue but, nonetheless, concluded that "that policy question,
involving, as it does, many weighty and conflicting considerations, must be resolved through the rule-making process and
not by judicial decision."9 In Robinson, defense counsel failed
to file notice of appeal within the 10-day time period as required by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 37(a)(2) and
45(b)9" because he was under the mistaken impression that
92. See NOTRE DAME LAWYER, supra note 88, at 73 n.3, citing, Butor, Finality in
CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,76HARv. L. REv. 441 (1963).
93. See NOTRE DAME LAWYER, supra note 88, at 73 n.4, citing Huff v. United States,
192 F.2d 911, 913-14 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 946 (1952).
94. See NOTRE DAME LAWYER, supra note 88, at 73.
95. Id.
96. 361 U.S. 220 (1960).
97. Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
98. FED. R. CRIM. P. 37(a)(2) provides:
An appeal by a defendant may be taken within 10 days after entry of the
judgment or order appealed from, but if a motion for a new trial or in arrest of
judgment has been made within the 10-day period an appeal from a judgment
of conviction may be taken within 10 days after entry of the order denying the
motion. When a court after trial imposes sentence upon a defendant not represented by counsel, the defendant shall be advised of his right to appeal and if
he so requests, the clerk shall prepare and file forthwith a notice of appeal on
behalf of the defendant. An appeal by the government when authorized by
statute may be taken within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 45(b) provides:
When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the
court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without
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the defendant would note his own appeal.9 The district court
granted the defendant leave to appeal, finding that the noncompliance was due to excusable neglect, and the court of appeals
affirmed. In reversing, the Supreme Court found that neither
the wording nor the history of rule 45(b) authorized such an
extension. For reasons to acquire importance below, it should be
noted that the defendant was aware of his right to appeal before
expiration of the 10-day filing period. 100
In Nelson the defendant, after his trial and conviction in a
Virginia court, was led from the courtroom never to see or converse with his counsel again. Not once prior to, during, or after
his trial had he been informed of his right to appeal; consequently, he failed to meet the mandatory notice requirement of
Virginia law and, therefore, was denied an appeal. Maintaining
that he was unaware of his right to appeal at all times prior to
the final date of filing, he moved for a writ of habeas corpus in
the federal district court. In granting the motion, the district
judge found that the defendant had been denied the effective
assistance of counsel and afforded the state 60 days to grant either a direct appeal or a new trial.
In affirming the actions of the district judge, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the Supreme Court cases establishing the breadth
and scope of the right to counsel,' 1 concluding that such a right
motion or notice, order the period enlarged if application therefor is made before
the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous
order or (2) upon motion permit the act to be done after the expiration of the
specified period if the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but the
court may not enlarge the period for taking any action under Rules 33, 34 and
35, except as otherwise provided in those rules, or the period for taking an
appeal.
99. 361 U.S. at 221 n.1.
100. Id. The defendant stated that he had discussed his appeal on the date of sentencing.
101. 415 F.2d at 1157:
Thus, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963),
establishes the basic right to counsel. "[A]ppointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights
of a criminal accused may be affected." Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134, 88
S. Ct. 254, 257, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967) (emphasis added). Such cases as Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964), Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967), and Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 (1967), mark the
beginning point at which the right to counsel comes into being. Once the right
has matured, the law is now certain that it continues through the conclusion of
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extends through the appellate process. In deciding that the right
to the effective assistance of counsel is denied in an instance, as
in Nelson, where a defendant was not aware, and had not been
informed, of his right to appeal, the court offered the following
persuasive analysis:
When the breadth and scope of the right to counsel as established by these cases is considered, we think it follows that an
indigent defendant is entitled to have counsel after his trial has
been concluded for at least as long as it is necessary for counsel
to advise him of his right to appeal, the manner and time in
which to appeal and whether an appeal has any hope of success,
unless counsel has provided advice as to the right to appeal and
the manner and time in which to appeal prior to the conclusion
of trial, or unless the trial court has advised the defendant in
the latter regard and shouldered the burden which is otherwise
that of counsel. Where counsel, as in the instant case, treat their
representation as terminated without having imparted such
advice, a defendant's right to counsel has been effectively denied; or, where counsel have not treated their representation as
terminated but fail to impart such advice, a defendant's right
to effective assistance of counsel has been effectively denied. In
either event, if the omissions of counsel have not been supplied
by advice imparted by the trial court as to the right to appeal
and the manner and time in which to appeal, a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right, as made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment, has been violated. 02
Since the federal courts in Nelson, in effect, had extended the
notice requirement of the Virginia appellate procedures, an
argument could be made, based upon Robinson, that they had
acted ultra vires. Robinson, however, is a case in which the
defendant was aware of his right to appeal, while in Nelson the
appellate review. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed. 2d
811 (1963); Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 87 S. Ct. 996, 18 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1967).
And "where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to
be furnished counsel does not depend on a request." Carnley v. Cochran, 369
U.S. 506, 513, 82 S. Ct. 884, 889, 8 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1962); Puckett v. North
Carolina, 343 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1965). Even if counsel appointed to conduct an
appeal concludes that the appeal is frivolous and desires to withdraw, he must,
nevertheless, brief anything in the record which might arguably support the
appeal, and if the court finds any legal point arguable on its merits, it must,
prior to decision, provide another attorney. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).
102. Id. at 1157-58 (footnotes omitted).
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defendant was not apprised of that right. And whereas Robinson
may stand for the proposition that a defendant may waive,
through his own negligence, a right of which he is aware, the
Fourth Circuit, in Nelson, reasoned logically that such a right
could not have been waived when, in fact, it was unknown. 3
Finally, the precedential value to be accorded to Robinson as a
basis for overruling Nelson becomes much less substantial when
one considers the fact that the issue upon which the latter was
decided - the right to counsel - played no part in the Supreme
Court decision.
In White the defendant sought post-conviction relief, alleging, inter alia, that he had been denied the effective assistance
of counsel because of trial counsel's failure to inform him of his
right to appeal. 4 Specifically, he asked the post-conviction hearing judge to grant him a new trial or a direct appeal and cited
Nelson and Shiflett v. Commonwealth of Virginia °5 as authority
for granting his requests. After finding the defendant's other assertions of error to be without merit, the hearing judge ruled,
however, that the defendant had not waived his right to appeal
by not filing timely notice and directed his counsel to petition the
supreme court for direct appeal.
In consideration of the defendant's appeal from the postconviction relief order, the supreme court held that it did not
have jurisdiction to grant an appeal absent compliance with section 7-405' °0 of the South Carolina Code of Laws and that "in the
absence of any showing of prejudice to the defendant, '"107 a hearing judge had no authority to grant a new trial when a defendant
had not been informed of his right to an appeal. The court's
103. In White the South Carolina Supreme Court found it incredible that, in view of
his past criminal record, the defendant was unaware of his right to an appeal. Conceiva-

bly, under Nelson, the defendant's prior record could support the assertion that he was
aware of his right. 415 F.2d at 1158. Nelson, however, clearly requires that not only must
a defendant be aware of the right to appeal, he must also be informed of the procedure
for asserting that right. 415 F.2d at 1157-58.
The Supreme Court has defined "waiver" to be the intentional concession of a known
right or privilege. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
104. Record at 130.

105. 447 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1971). In Shiflett the court considered the retroactive
applicability of Nelson and decided that "the standards prevailing before [Nelson] was

announced [would] be applied in all cases in which the time for instituting an appeal
had expired on or before June 25, 1969." Id. at 57-58.
106. See note 89 supra.
107. 263 S.C. at 119, 208 S.E.2d at 39.
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decision, if to be afforded precedential effect,'"' seemingly opens
the gates to a potential flood of federal habeas corpus petitions.
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court is not bound to
follow Fourth Circuit decisions, that court's inclination to order
the states to provide appeals or new trials to defendants who have
been denied appeals because they were not aware of their rights
has clearly been expressed in Nelson and Shiflett. Moreover, to
condition the right to a new trial or an appeal upon a showing of
prejudice directly contravenes the language of those cases. In
Nelson the Fourth Circuit observed:
The right to counsel and the effective assistance of counsel is too
basic a right to condition entitlement thereto upon an uninformed, untrained, unintelligent, indigent petitioner's showing
that his appeal would have at least debatable merit when the
ability to
make and preserve a record was not even within his
9
grasp.'

0

In concluding its analysis, the court reasoned
Once denied.

. .

the burden of proving [the right to an appeal]

valueless in a given case must rest upon [the state] which
denied the right by the omissions of counsel which it supplied,
if, indeed, the law will countenance such a defense."'
In Shiflett, the Fourth Circuit seemed to conclude that the law
would not permit the defense by stating that
the decision to exercise or forego a guaranteed right is for the
108. It should be noted that the holding in White may easily be limited to its peculiar
circumstances. In issuing his order, the hearing judge did not frame the waiver issue in a
denial of counsel context. Record at 168. Even though defendant had properly raised that
issue in his motion for post-conviction relief (record at 130), he failed to assert it in his
appellate brief. In other words, even though he did argue, in his appellate brief, that he
had been impermissibly denied an appeal, he failed to assert that that denial resulted out
of the denial of counsel. Brief for Appellant at 18-20. As a result, the failure to properly
phrase the issue so that Nelson would apply would leave section 7-405 as the only basis
upon which the court could assume jurisdiction. In such a light the supreme court's
conclusion that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal may be justifiable. Insofar
as counsel is not permitted oral argument on appeal of a post-conviction relief order (see
text accompanying note 117 infra), however, he was deprived of such an opportunity to
properly frame the issue for the court. Because "jurisdiction of the federal courts on
habeas corpus is not affected by procedural defaults incurred by the applicant during the
state court proceeding . . . " the defendant should still be able to avail himself of his
federal remedies. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
109. 415 F.2d at 1159.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
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and he must be provided full

information on which to make an informed choice. . although
he need have no good or rationalreason for his decision."'
As a result, the South Carolina Supreme Court's holding that it
was without authority to grant an appeal absent compliance with
section 7-405 and that there was no authority for granting a new
trial on the ground that the defendant had not been informed of
his right to appeal, absent a showing of prejudice, obviates the
need for such defendants to exhaust their state remedies in order
to qualify for federal habeas relief."2
In conclusion, one final point should be noted. In South Carolina, as in most other jurisdictions, the post-conviction relief
procedure is not to be considered an adequate substitute for a
direct appeal."' Thus, although the South Carolina Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act"' is very broad, a defendant loses
certain entitlements under it which he would be afforded on appeal. He is entitled neither to counsel nor a transcript prior to
approval of a hearing on his application for post-conviction relief."' During the hearing he may not challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence adduced at trial, as he may on appeal."' Finally, his
counsel is not permitted oral argument on appeal of the postconviction relief order." 7 In some instances, therefore, the collat111. 447 F.2d at 53-54 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970), which states in pertinent part:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless
it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts
of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective
process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the prisoner.
113. See The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-601(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1973), which provides in part: "(b) This remedy is not a substitute for nor
does it affect any remedy incident ... of direct review of the sentence or conviction."
See also State v. Taylor, 255 S.C. 268, 178 S.E.2d 244 (1970); accord, Shiflett v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 447 F.2d at 61 (Winter, J., dissenting).
114. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-601-12 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
115. See Wood v. State, 257 S.C. 179, 184 S.E.2d 702 (1971). Since a defendant is
not entitled to counsel until his application is accepted, it follows that he would not be
entitled to a transcript. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Wood v. State, 257
S.C. 179, 184 S.E.2d 702 (1971).
116. The last sentence to § 17-601(a)(6) of the Act provides that "this section shall
not be construed to permit collateral attack on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction."
117. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. 29.
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eral remedies afforded under the Act may not suffice to allow the
state to assert that the defendant has not been prejudiced by the
failure of the state to afford him an appeal.11
B.

The Right to the Assistance of an Expert

In 1968 the South Carolina Legislature demonstrated timely
perspicacity in enacting legislation by which counsel for indigent
criminal defendants may be compensated for out-of-pocket expenses incurred during the course of representation. Section 17287 of the South Carolina Code of Laws"' permits a trial judge,
upon proper motion, to authorize the State Treasurer to disburse
funds to defense counsel for a seemingly unliinited range of legitimate expenses. Although the statute does not specifically authorize disbursal for the purpose of hiring independent expert witnesses, the South Carolina Supreme Court has tacitly supplied
such a meaning to the statutory language and thereby has obviated the need to consider whether the failure to make such
funds available constitutes an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection and due process.2 The court's posture on the applica118. One of the reasons cited by the United States Supreme Court in Robinson in
support of the rigid notice requirement under rules 37(b)(2) and 45(b) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure appeared in the final footnote of that decision: "The allowance of
an appeal months or years after the prescribed time seems unnecessary for the accomplishment of substantial justice, for there are a number of collateral remedies available to
redress denial of basic rights." 361 U.S. at 230 n.14. Such an argument, however, loses its
persuasive effect in view of both the expansion accorded the right to counsel since the date
Robinson was decided and the fact that in situations such as White, collateral remedies
do not fully redress the deprivations which occur from the denial of an appeal.
119. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-287 (Cum. Supp. 1973) [hereinafter cited as § 17-287]:
§ 17-287. Appropriation for expenses of appointed private counsel and
public defenders. In addition to the appropriation in § 17-286, there is
hereby appropriated for the first fiscal year commencing July 1, 1969 the sum
of fifty thousand dollars for the establishment of the defense fund which shall
be administered by the State Treasurer. This fund shall be used to reimburse
private appointed counsel, public defenders, and assistant public defenders for
necessary expenses actually incurred in the representation of persons pursuant
to this chapter, provided that the expenses are approved by the trial judge. No
reimbursement shall be made for travel expenses except extraordinary travel
expenses approved by the trial judge. The total State funds provided by this
section shall not exceed fifty thousand dollars.
120. Courts have recognized that denial of the means by which to hire an expert can
have the effect of denying to a defendant a fair trial by impairing his ability to assert a
particular defense and of denying him the effective assistance of counsel, in contravention
of the sixth amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
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bility of section 17-287 to funds for expert witnesses was stated
in State v. Williams, 2' a case which demonstrates, among other
things, that there are some members of the bar who are not aware
of this invaluable statute's existence, let alone its breadth.
The defendant had shot the victim in the neck, causing
paralysis to the lower part of her body. Eight months later she
died, allegedly from a blood clot which passed from her legs into
her heart, cutting off the supply of blood to her lungs and causing
her death. The defendant had originally been charged with assault and battery with the intent to kill; after the victim's death,
however, an additional charge of murder was brought. Prior to
trial the defendant requested the court to order the Charleston
County Treasurer to authorize funds for the employment of an
independent medical pathologist. 122 Since disprovement of the
causal connection between the gun-shot wound and death was
considered to be an essential element of the defense, counsel asserted that such a tactic could not be adequately pursued without
the independent expert assistance. The trial judge correctly concluded that he had no authority to order the county treasurer to
provide the needed funds but incorrectly assumed that there were
no other sources from which those funds could have been made
available; nevertheless, he did provide defense counsel with the
opportunity to bring alternative sources to his attention. Neither
the defenseiss nor the prosecution informed the court of the existUnited States Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645
(1966); State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 241, 453 P.2d 421 (1969); State v.
Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966). But see Arizona v. Superior Court, 2 Ariz. App.
458, 409 P.2d 742 (1966). One court has suggested that denial of funds to hire an expert
would make meaningless a defendant's right to compulsory process to have that expert
called as a witness, in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments. People v. Watson, supra, 221 N.E.2d at 648. When the rights of indigent criminal defendants are adversely affected because of inability to pay for needed services, courts have found a denial
of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. The United States Supreme Court
has stated that there "can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
on the amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956); cf. Collins v.
State, 14 Md. App. 674, 288 A.2d 221 (1972).
121. 263 S.C. 290, 299, 210 S.E.2d 298, 303 (1974). The court stated that "the Legislature has seen fit to make funds available for the purposes here sought."
122. It would be advisable for the supreme court to require lower courts to consider
motions for assistance under § 17-287 in an ex parte context. Federal courts have determined that the use of adversary hearings could infringe upon a defendant's right against
self-condemnation and, therefore, are to be avoided. Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d
1315 (7th Cir. 1970).
123. Defense counsel never attempted to locate § 17-287, and apparently were unaware of its existence at the time defendant's appellate brief was prepared. In explanation
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ence of section 17-287.124
The defendant did not contend that upon request an indigent
defendant has an absolute right to funds for the purposes herein
sought. Instead, he contended that the failure to approve funds
in the factual situation of-Williams unfairly impeded his defense
and limited the effectiveness of his counsel and thereby served to
deny him due process and equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the South Carolina Constitution. 25 The supreme court
12
confronted only the latter issue.
of their failure to investigate other sources of funds, defense counsel offered the following
reason:
Counsel for defendant was unable to investigate any possible source of funds
authorized by statute for consultation of expert witnesses. Defendant was arraigned on January 7, 1974. That afternoon, [co-counsel], who was the counsel
responsiblefor expert testimony, was notified of trial of another indigent defendant in the matter of State of South Carolinav. Henry Stanley Johnson, a case
involving charges of Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature and
of Robbery. That trial, in the County Court for Charleston County, lasted
through January 8 until after 10:00 p.m. on January 9, 1974, when a mistrial
was declared because the jury could not agree. This case was tried beginning
January 10, 1974.
Brief for Appellant at 2, State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290, 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974) (emphasis
added).
124. In its appellate brief, the state pointed to the existence of § 17-287 and asserted
that defendant should not be allowed to appeal the denial of funding because of his failure
to avail himself of the statute. In support of its position, the state cited the supreme court
to State v. Bradley, 210 S.C. 75, 79, 41 S.E.2d 608, 610, where the general rule is stated
to be as follows: "One who seeks relief in an appellate court must show that in the trial
below he was deprived of substantial right, after having exhausted all reasonable means
within his reach to preserve it." Brief for Appellee at 3. It is unsettled in this state as to
whether, had he known of § 17-287 during the pretrial hearing, the solicitor was under a
duty to call it to the court's attention. Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(5) commands that "[a]
lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."
Ethical Consideration 7-13 calls attention to the fact that "[t]he responsibility of a
public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not
merely to confict." Disciplinary Rule 7-106(B)(1) requires that "[iun presenting a matter
to a tribunal a lawyer shall disclose legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known
to him to be directly adverse to the position of his client and which is not disclosed by
opposing counsel." Also of arguable importance is Disciplinary Ruel 7-103(B) which requires a prosecutor in criminal litigation to "make timely disclosure to counsel for the
defendant . . . of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor . . . . that tends
to negate the guilt of the accused [or] mitigate the degree of the offense . . . ." Whether

this rule extends to cover the availabilityof evidence which may tend to have the above
effects is uncertain. See generally ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmmLrrY, S.C. Sup.

CT. R. 32., Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
125. See S.C. CONsT. art. 1, § 3 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
126. 263 S.C. at 298-99, 210 S.E.2d at 303.
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Noting the certainty with which the state's expert testified
as to the causal connection and the absense of other possible
sources of causation, the court concluded that the defendant was
merely speculating as to the value of independent expert testimony and that mere conjecture could not serve to substantiate a
finding of reversible error. 127 The supreme court interpreted that
portion of section 17-287 which requires the trial judge's approval
of any disbursement to mean that approval should be given only
if the defendant establishes that the funds are reasonably necessary to his defense. Since the trial judge in Williams had not
attempted to make any such determination, the court took it
upon itself to decide whether the defendant had made the required showing. In deciding against the defendant, it noted that
the only proffered justification was that an expert might be found
who would disagree with the state's witness and concluded that
such a conjectural reason, standing alone, would not suffice to
pass the "reasonably necessary" test. The supreme court's conclusion in this regard was based both upon a misconstrual of the
test and a misunderstanding of the defendant's contentions.
It is beyond dispute that there is more involved in the construction of a proper defense than its mere presentation at trial.
Pretrial preparation is at least of equal, if not greater, significance
than presentation; for the efficacy of the latter necessarily depends upon the quality of the former. 1 8 In an odd factual context
such as the one presented in Williams, the services of an independent medical expert could have been of immense aid to defense
counsel beyond the provision of rebuttal testimony. Insofar as the
issue of causation in a homicide case is one for the jury, expert
assistance could have been invaluable to counsel's preparation for
cross-examination of the state's expert and for opening and closing arguments. In preparing counsel for those two aspects of presentation, it makes little difference whether the defense expert
agrees or disagrees with the conclusions of the state's pathologist.
All that need be provided are the tools and knowledge to call
those conclusions into doubt. Where, as here, the state's witness
admits that an eight month gap between infliction of the fatal
127. Id.
128. It has been suggested that "even more serious than the need for witnesses is the
problem of securing information from which to construct a defense." Note, Right to Aid
in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L. REV. 1054, 1061
(1963).
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wound and death is rare and that alternative sources of causation
are possible, although in his opinion improbable to "the highest
degree of medical certainty," it seems manifestly unfair to expect
defense counsel to have the necessary expertise to attempt to
dispute effectively the findings of a qualified forensic patholo29
gist.

The supreme court's finding that the defendant's only contention was that funds might enable him to find an expert to
disagree with the state's medical examiner seems to oversimplify
that which was actually asserted. During the pretrial hearing on
the motion, defense counsel stated that he needed the assistance
of an expert "in determining whether or not the cause of death
stated by the medical examiner [was] in fact the true cause of
death."' 30 Counsel expounded upon his need for expert assistance
in defendant's appellate brief, where he stated that such assistance was necessary to determine whether other conditions in the
deceased's system could have caused the death and to aid him in
developing effectively for the jury "the full impact of the fact that
blood clots rarely occur such a long time after a person suffers an
31
injury."'
The court attempted to substantiate the label of "conjecture" which it attached to this contention by noting that the
competency and credibility of the state's witness were unchallenged and that "[i]n so far as this record shows, any other
expert employed by appellant would have to rely upon the physical findings from the autopsy performed by the State's witness.'

32

This statement appears to be inaccurate for two reasons.

First, it would not be rabidly hypothetical to assume that another
expert could make an opposite finding as to the cause of death
by emphasizing different factors in the description of the deceased's body as stated in the autopsy report. Second, and of
more basic importance, the record does not show that the expert
would have to rely on the findings of the state's pathologist. In129. See United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 1970), where the Eighth
Circuit noted another element of unfairness which arises in situations similar to Williams.
Since the state has no problem in obtaining expert evidence, denial to the defendant of
the means to obtain the same would inhibit him in his ability to confront the issue on an
equal basis with the state.
130. Record at 9, State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290, 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974) (emphasis
added).
131. Brief for Appellant at 7.
132. 263 S.C. at 300, 210 S.E.2d at 303 (emphasis added).
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stead, it reveals that tissue specimens from the victim's body
were preserved and, at the time, presumably could have been
examined by another expert. 3 3 Both during argument on the motion and in the appellate brief, counsel asserted his inability to
make the examination and the resulting need for expert assis34
tance to accomplish the same.'
Even if it was only the expert testimony which was sought
and even if the value of such testimony was only conjectural, it
seems unfair for defense counsel to be placed in the position of
having to know for a fact, as the supreme court seems to demand,
that a disagreeing expert exists, in order for the defendant to
qualify for funds to hire such an expert. In other words, it seems
absurd to require counsel to know in advance the answer to the
very problem for which he seeks expert resolution. Moreover, how
may counsel be expected to demonstrate, on appeal, the manner
in which the defendant had suffered prejudice below, when at the
prior stage, counsel had been foreclosed from even the opportunity of effectively investigating the very issue from which the prejudice was contended to have arisen? The Supreme Court of Iowa,
under a statute similar to section 17-287, took a more enlightened
approach by remanding a case for retrial on the ground that the
denial of the defendant's request "effectively prevented the defendant from even the possibility of obtaining evidence which
may have been highly relevant and material to a meaningful
1 3
defense." 1
The South Carolina Supreme Court's holding that a finding
of conjectural value will suffice to deny a request for expert assistance reflects a basic misinterpretation of the test to be applied.
The standard is not whether the failure to provide funds caused
the defense to fail;' 36 obviously, any value judgment thereupon
also would be purely "conjectural." The test which should be
applied involves a 2-part inquiry into whether the defense was
proper' 3 and whether the expert assistance was reasonably neces133. Record at 9.

134. Id.; Brief for Appellant at 7.
135. State v. Hancock, 164 N.W.2d 330, 332-33 (Iowa 1969) (interpreting IowA CODE
ANN. § 775.5 (1965)).
136. See United States v. Pope, 251 F. Supp. 234, 241 (D.C. Neb. 1966) in which the
court stated: "The rule in allowing defense services is that the judge need only be satisfied
that they reasonably appear to be necessary to assist counsel in their preparation, not that
the defense would be defective without such testimony."
137. Obviously, there are situations in which an attack upon the causation element
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3
sary to the preparation and presentation of that defense.' 1
Where, as here, a defendant seeks to defend by attempting to
disprove a complex chain of medical causation, there can be denial neither of the propriety of the defense nor of the fact that
expert medical assistance is not only reasonably necessary, but
absolutely crucial.
In two cases' 39 where state courts failed to provide psychiatric
aid, the United States Supreme Court held that where there was
a "'bona fide doubt' as to a defendant's competence," failure to
invoke the statutory procedure authorizing the psychiatric aid
required reversal because that failure, in essence, deprived defenwould be frivolous and would result in abuse of the statutory procedure permitted under
§ 17-287. For instance, to allow defense counsel the opportunity to consult an expert in
order to determine whether or not the state pathologist was in error in concluding that
decapitation had caused a victim's death would usually be ludicrous and, therefore, not
necessary to a proper defense. Williams, however, presents a factual situation in which a
reasonable doubt as to the cause of death could easily arise; unless the court wished to
make the opinion of the state's expert irrebuttable, the defense sought to be asserted was
a proper one. See, e.g., Terlekowski v. United States, 379 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1967), in which
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's refusal to allow a defendant to subpoena
witnesses. In opening argument to the jury, defense counsel admitted that the defendant
had no defense other than not being able to recall any occurrences on the date of the crime
for which he was charged; nonetheless, prior to trial counsel attempted to obtain funds
for calling a long list of witnesses. Finding that the testimony sought would not have been
relevant or material to a defense, the court concluded: "The trial court carefully considered [the defendant's] motion for witnesses and properly denied only those which would
have resulted in a useless and abusive issuance of process at government expense."
Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
138. Chief Judge Timbers of the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut noted that "[tihere are virtually no established criteria for determining
when 'investigative, expert, or other services necessary to an adequate defense should
be authorized by the court . . .'" Timbers, Judicial Perspectives on the Operationof
the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 55, 60 (1967). In United States v.
Theriault, 440 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1971), the Fifth Circuit concluded that the determination
should be made on a case by case basis and refused to specify criteria to guide trial judges.
Of more importance in that case was the concurring opinion of Judge Wisdom. Noting
that one of the purposes of legislation like § 17-287 is to place indigent defendants on an
equal level with nonindigents, he stated:
I would read the statute . . . as requiring authorization for defense services
when the attorney makes a reasonable request in circumstances in which he
would independently engage such services if his client had the financial means
to support his defenses. The trial judge should tend to rely on the judgment of
the attorney, who has the primary duty of providing an adequate defense. Such
reliance is recommended by the difficulty of requiring the trial judge to take an
adversary view of the case.
Id. at 716-17.
139. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375
(1966).
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dant of his due process right to a fair trial."' Thus, in the factual
context of Williams, can it be said that there was not at least a
"bona fide doubt" that the assistance which an expert could have
provided counsel in understanding the medical issues would not
have aided him in confronting those issues at trial to the degree
necessary in order to dissuade at least one juror on the element
of causation? An answer in the negative should compel a court
to reverse on the ground that the failure to observe the statutory
procedure (section 17-287) which was designed to protect the defendant's right to assert a meaningful defense, deprived him of
his right to a fair trial. Moreover, to hold otherwise and not to
allow defendant to indulge in a certain amount of speculation as
to his need for expert assistance, in some instances, would have
the unjustifiable effect of cloaking the findings of the state expert
with a presumption which the defendant would be foreclosed even
from the opportunity to rebut. In conclusion, if the decision in
State v. Williams remains unchanged, its long-term effect will be
to cause the state to deprive indigent defendants with the judicial
hand of that which it has offered in the legislative hand.
C.

Confessions

In United States v. Johnson,4 ' the defendant was arrested
and jailed for armed robbery. Soon thereafter his wife was placed2
4
in custody for alleged complicity in his abortive escape attempt.
The morning following the wife's arrest, the defendant, assertedly
seeking her release, signed a waiver card' and confessed to the
robbery. He subsequently contended that because of the "hostage
posture"'' into which his wife had been placed, his confession
was involuntary.
The United States District Court for South Carolina, pursuant to the dictates of Jackson v. Denno,'45 held an extensive
140. 420 U.S. at 173.
141. 495 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1974).
142. Id. at 382. The defendant instructed his wife to arrange bail for another inmate
who had been incarcerated on a minor charge. When the inmate's name was called, the
defendant responded. Prior to release, a routine fingerprint check was made, the ruse
discovered, and the defendant returned to his cell.
143. The waiver card contained the standard Miranda warnings.
144. 495 F.2d at 382.
145. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Jacksonrequired that a "reliable and clear-cut" determination of voluntariness be made prior to the submission of a confession to the jury. See also
United States v. Inman, 352 F.2d 954, 956 (4th Cir. 1965), in which the Fourth Circuit
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suppression hearing in order to determine whether the confession
had been freely and voluntarily made. Upon the evidence presented at the hearing, the district judge concluded that the confession was voluntary within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)'46
and, theref6re, properly admissible at trial. In reaching its decision, the court deviated from the standard previously adhered to
in the Fourth Circuit.
Prior to Johnson and pursuant to United States v. Inman,'47
a district judge in the Fourth Circuit was not permitted to allow
a confession to go to the jury unless he was convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that it was voluntary."' The judge in Johnson,
however, felt constrained by the recent Supreme Court case of
Lego v. Twomey"' to utilize the less stringent standard approved
there whereby voluntariness need be established only by a preponderance of the evidence.5 ' The defendant appealed, contending that the district court had applied an incorrect standard.
In affirming the action of the district judge, the Fourth Circuit interpreted Lego "as a direction that the federal courts shall
follow the preponderance standard."' 5' In so noting, the court
concluded that "the directions of Inman must be revised to admit
those confessions into evidence where voluntariness is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence rather than the higher
1' 5 2
degree of proof.
detailed the procedure for making that determination: "On proffer of the confession, even
though there be no objection, the court should let the jury withdraw, and then take
evidence upon the confession and its factual setting . . . . The court will thereupon
independently determine whether the confession is admissible."
146. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1970) states in pertinent part:
The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including
(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making
the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether
such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of
which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not
such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any
statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether
or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to
assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the
assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
147. 352 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1965).
148. Id. at 956.
149. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
150. 495 F.2d at 382.
151. Id. at 383.
152. Id.
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The court's conclusion that its abandonment of the reasonable doubt standard was mandated by Lego may be merely an
inferential one.'53 That case contains no unequivocal command to
adopt the less stringent standard, 54' even though it is clearly
within the Supreme Court's power to order it.' 55 The Constitution

does not require that either standard be adopted; 5 ' rather, it
demands only that a defendant receive a "reliable and clear cut"
determination of the voluntariness of his confession prior to its
submission to the jury. 57 Thus, prior to Lego, specification of the
standard to be applied was a matter within the supervisory powers of the circuit courts."'8
In making such a determination, the courts had to weigh
conflicting goals-protection of the individual's right against
compelled self-condemnation versus "the public interest in placing probative evidence before juries for the purpose of arriving at
truthful decisions about guilt or innocence." 5 ' Those jurisdictions
adhering to the higher standard of reasonable doubt placed emphasis upon the former value,' 0 while proponents of the prepon153. In Lego, the Supreme Court did no more than to uphold an application of the
preponderance standard. It based its refusal to require the reasonable doubt standard
upon the fact that "no substantial evidence has accumulated that federal rights have
suffered from determining admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence." 404 U.S.
at 488. At the same time, however, there has been no substantial evidence that those rights
have not suffered; in any case, because of the inherent difficulty in making such empirical
determinations, the justification given seems to be an unstable one upon which to allow
those rights to depend. Cf. 404 U.S. at 393 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Fourth Circuit,
nevertheless, inferred from the following language that the reasonable doubt standard was
no longer to be applied: "It is no more persuasive to impose the stricter standard of proof
as an exercise of supervisory power than as a constitutional rule. Cf. Ralph v. Warden,
supra,n.1, clarifying United States v. Inman, supra,n.1. . .404 U.S. at 488, n.16 .. "
495 F.2d at 383. Because Lego is devoid of any language expressly abolishing use of the
reasonable doubt standard, it should be viewed as no more than an affirmance of the use
of the less stringent test. The dissent's criticism seems to support this conclusion in that
it is directed solely at the majority's refusal to insist upon the higher standard of proof.
Moreover, although the Supreme Court has ruled that an across-the-board imposition of
the reasonable doubt standard is, in its view, unwarranted, there is no strong reason to
expect that it would reverse a circuit court which had imposed that standard after having
decided in good faith that protection of the individual from coerced self-condemnation
outweighs considerations to the contrary. See text accompanying notes 156 and 158 infra.
154. See note 13 supra.
155. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970).
156. 404 U.S. at 488.
157. Cf. 404 U.S. at 489-90.
158. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 1970).
159. 404 U.S. at 490.
160. See, e.g., Pea v. United States, 397 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1967), aff'd on rehearing,
397 F.2d at 637 (1968); United States v. Inman, 352 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1965); People v.
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derance standard considered the latter more important.' 1 In originally adopting the reasonable doubt standard, the Fourth Circuit had held protection of the individual to be the more desirable
goal 62 and in Johnson there is no evidence that it had reevaluated its position.'63 Consequently, it seems unfortunate that
a circuit court should be placed in the position of having to disregard its own value judgments in order to maintain allegiance to
that which it may very well believe to be a less worthy consideration.'64
In State v. Patterson,6 ' the issue of the voluntariness of a
confession arose in a context factually similar to that in Johnson.
The defendant contended that he had been coerced into confessing to murder and into providing the authorities with information
which led to the discovery of the alleged murder weapon. Underlying defendant's contention was the fact that his girlfriend had
been arrested for complicity in the crime. The defendant testified
that the interrogating officers promised to release the girlfriend
in return for a confession. Although those officers denied making
such a promise, they "freely [admitted] having suggested that
her release would be the likely result of a statement by him which
exonerated her."' 6 The trial court, after holding a Jackson hearing outside the presence of the jury, concluded that "the state
[had] shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was,
in fact, free and voluntary ....
Upon review, the South Carolina Supreme Court will not
overturn a conclusive finding of voluntariness unless that finding
is demonstrated to be "so manifestly erroneous as to show an
Huntly, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965); State v. Thundershield,
83 S.D. 414, 160 N.W.2d 408 (1968).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 469 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1972); Duncan v.
State, 278 Ala. 145, 176 So.2d 840 (1965); State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d 553
(1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 942 (1971); Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232
N.E.2d 335 (1967).
162. 352 F.2d at 956.
163. In Johnson, the Fourth Circuit observed that whether "we would continue to
adhere to the Inman standard may be debatable." Therefore, there is no reason to believe
that the court has deviated from its former ideal. 495 F.2d at 383.
164. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the only other
circuit previously adhering to the reasonable doubt standard, has not, as yet, succumbed
to the Lego-Johnson rationale.
165. 263 S.C. 176, 209 S.E.2d 39 (1974).
166. Id. at 40 n.2.
167. Record at 190.
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abuse of judicial discretion,"' 68 or, in other words, unless it does

not appear to be "a reasonable inference from the evidence. 1' 69 In
Pattersonthe supreme court found that the trial judge's "conclusion that appellant's confession was freely and voluntarily made
[was] supported by abundant evidence and [was] binding
....

))170

In support of its finding, the court noted that the

defendant "had no reason to think that [his girlfriend] would be
framed and does not profess to have harbored such fear,' 17' and,
as a result, that "the trial judge was not bound to believe that
his confession was the product of concern for [her] well-being
rather than of his own free will." '
Whereas the standard to be applied by the trial judge in
determining the voluntariness of a confession has been specified
in the Fourth Circuit,' 73 it does not appear that South Carolina
courts are governed by any such hard-and-fast rule. Instead, state
courts evidently have applied the reasonable doubt standard in
some cases, 17 and a lower standard in others. 175 Supreme court
opinions do not provide any guidance as to which standard is
appropriate; conclusions as to voluntariness, however, have been
upheld on a variety of grounds, e.g., as when supported by "evidence showing adequate safeguards, ' ' 7 when clearly shown to be
voluntary by the testimony and surrounding circumstances,'77
when supported by "substantial evidence,"' 78 when "reasonably
168. State v. Bellue, 260 S.C. 39, 42, 194 S.E.2d 193, 194 (1973); State v. Henderson,
74 S.C. 477, 479, 55 S.E. 117, 118 (1906).
169. 260 S.C. at 42, 194 S.E.2d at 194; State v. Bethea, 241 S.C. 6, 24, 126 S.E.2d
846, 850 (1962).
170. 263 S.C. at 181, 209 S.E.2d at 41.
171. Id.
172. Id. The court's conclusion in this respect does not necessarily follow from the
fact that the defendant did "not profess to have harbored" the fear that his girlfriend
would be "framed." The system of justice followed in the United States, like all others, is
by no means infallible, and the fact remains that people have been convicted for crimes
that they did not commit. It would not have been opprobrius for the defendant to have
assumed that the state legitimately believed itself to have a case against the girlfriend,
even though he knew she was innocent.
173. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
174. Record at 190, State v. Patterson, 263 S.C. 176, 209 S.E.2d 39 (1974); State v.
Cannon, 260 S.C. 537, 543, 197 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1973); record at 213, State v. Bellue, 260
S.C. 39, 194 S.E.2d 193 (1973).
175. Record at 35, State v. White, 253 S.C. 475, 171 S.E.2d 712 (1969) (a foundation
has been laid); record at 42, State v. Richardson, 253 S.C. 468, 171 S.E.2d 717 (1969) (the
proper foundation has been offered).
176. State v. White, 253 S.C. at 480, 171 S.E.2d at 715.
177. State v. Richardson, 253 S.C. at 473, 171 S.E.2d at 719.
178. State v. Patterson, 263 S.C. at 179, 209 S.E.2d at 40.
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supported" by the testimony,179 or when not "manifestly erroneous."' 80 Moreover, the applicable standard has not been specified in the state constitution or by legislative enactment."'
The absence of a specific standard may be troublesome to
both the state and to the defendant from the standpoint of trial
tactics and could work a hardship upon the efficient administration of justice. The circumstances surrounding a particular confession may support a finding of voluntariness by a preponderance standard yet fail to remove all reasonable doubt that such
a confession was made voluntarily. It is not illogical, therefore, to
assume that there may be instances where the standard to be
applied, if a matter of common knowledge between the parties,
could be dispositive of whether a case should proceed to trial. 8"
In any event, it should be remembered by counsel for both sides
that the door remains open as to which standard should be applied and that they have the burden of persuading the court

thereon. 183
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Lego leaves
the South Carolina Supreme Court free to determine the test of
voluntariness to be applied by its trial courts.8 4 From the standpoints of fairness to the parties and of judicial efficiency, it is
hoped that the supreme court or the Legislature will see fit to
specify the applicable standard. Relevant to such a determination, the more persuasive rationale as to which standard should
179. State v. Bellue, 260 S.C. at 42, 194 S.E.2d at 194.
180. Id.
181. Cf. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (Cum. Supp. 1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-405 (1962).
182. Knowledge beforehand that the stricter standard would be applied might lead
the prosecution to drop a case or, at least, to refuse the use of a confession at trial.
Conversely, if it were known that the less stringent preponderance standard was to be
used, defense counsel would be enabled thereby to make a more informed decision as to
whether or not to enter a plea of guilty or to proceed to trial, thus perhaps saving his client
and the state the added expense of carrying a case to trial. As was expressed so succinctly
by Justice Brennan in Lego "[w]hen the question before the fact finder is whether to
believe one or the other of two self-serving accounts of what had happened, it is apparent
that the standard of persuasion will in many instances be of controlling significance."
404 U.S. at 492.
183. Under the system used in South Carolina it must be assumed that knowledge
of the standard to be applied would have a more pronounced effect upon the government's
decision-making process since the defendant still has the right to have the trial judge
charge the jury that it may not consider the confession unless it finds beyond a reasonable
doubt that it was freely and voluntarily made. See State v. Cannon, 260 S.C. at 546, 197
S.E.2d at 681-82.
184. "[The States are free . . . to adopt a higher standard [as a result of their
own] resolution of the values they find at stake." 404 U.S. at 490.
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apply seems to be that expressed in Justice Brennan's dissent in
Lego. In contrasting the standard used to resolve civil actions
with that applied in criminal actions, Justice Brennan noted that
the preponderance standard was adopted in civil actions because
it is " no more serious in general for there to be an erroneous
verdict in defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous
verdict in plaintiff's favor."'8 The stricter standard required in
criminal cases, however, is based upon the premise that "it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than [it is] to let a guilty man
go free."'8 6
Reasoning from that contrast and analogizing the standard
used to determine the voluntariness of a confession with that used
to make the determination of guilt or innocence of an individual
in a criminal case, Justice Brennan concluded that
[i]f we permit the prosecution to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that a confession was voluntary, then, . . .we
must be prepared to justify the view that it is no more serious
in general to admit involuntary confessions than it is to exclude
voluntary confessions.'
Correspondingly, since "the command of the fifth amendment
reflects the determination of our society that it is worse to permit
involuntary self-condemnation than it is to deprive a jury of probative evidence,"'8 8 the difficulty of justifying a less than reasonable doubt standard becomes insuperable.'
D. PretrialIdentification Procedures
In State v. Rogers"' the defendant was convicted of raping a
13-year-old girl. After the attack he drove her back to the location
from which he had abducted her. The girl then walked home and
reported the incident to her mother, who in turn summoned the
police. In her statement to the police the prosecutrix described in
meticulous detail both her attacker and his automobile. Soon
thereafter the defendant was arrested and transported to the
sheriff's department where he was identified in a show-up viewed
185. Id. at 493 citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970).
186. Id. at 494 citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970).
187. 404 U.S. at 494.
188. Id. at 495.
189. The Lego majority did not view the balance to be struck in the same light. See
text accompanying note 159 supra; see also note 153 supra.
190. 263 S.C. 373, 210 S.E.2d 604 (1974).
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by the victim through a one-way mirror. The following day the
defendant was required to participate in a line-up where he was
again correctly identified. Counsel was not present during either
identification procedure. At trial the state did not introduce evidence as to either the show-up or the line-up but instead relied
upon the complaining witness's in-court identification of the defendant.
On appeal, counsel for the defendant argued that the trial
court was in error in admitting the in-court identification. It was
contended that since the accused had been subjected to the pretrial identification procedures without the benefit of counsel's
presence and because those procedures were "so unnecessarily
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification"' 91 as to constitute a denial of due process, any in-court identification would
necessarily be tainted and should be excluded per se. In support
of that contention, counsel relied upon the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall
line of cases"2 decided by the United States Supreme Court in
1967. In disproving the defendant's argument, the South Carolina
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Ness, offered a wellreasoned, formal analysis of the law governing pretrial identification procedures.
Initially, the court noted that the trial judge had taken the
required procedural safeguards in order to insure that in-court
identification had not been tainted by the show-up and the lineup. 9' The trial judge determined that there was no likelihood of
irreparable misidentification due to the pretrial procedures and
that the in-court identification was based upon a sufficiently
independent source. Consequently, he admitted the in-court
identification into evidence. In making that determination the
trial court followed the procedure set forth in United States v.
191. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
192. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
193. The procedure followed in South Carolina is outlined in State v. Cash, 257 S.C.
249, 253, 185 S.E.2d 525, 526-27 (1971):
When the State offers witnesses whose testimony tends to identify [the defendant] as the [person] who committed the crime charged in the indictment and
[he interposes] timely objections challenging that the in-court identification by
the witness is tainted by an illegal [pretrial identification], the trial judge
should conduct a hearing in the absence of the jury and the competency of the
evidence should be evaluated. In such hearing, the testimony should be taken
and all factual questions determined including those involving the appellant's
constitutional rights pertinent to the admissibility of the proffered evidence.
194. 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967). Factors to be considered are the following:
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Wade.'9' On review, it only remained for Justice Ness to determine whether the evidence supported the trial court's findings.
In order to establish that an in-court identification is based
upon sources sufficiently independent to dissipate any taint resulting from illegal pretrial procedures, the state must substantiate those sources through clear and convincing evidence. 9 5 The
supreme court found ample authority for the proposition that
there was more than enough evidence that neither the line-up"96
nor the show-up'97 in Rogers in any way detracted from the accuracy of the prosecutrix' in-court identification of the defendant.
In support of this conclusion, Justice Ness stated:
Suffice it to say that the proof here was more than ample; the
victim spent a half hour or more in the company of her assailant
in broad daylight; made her first identification just a short time
after the incident, was highly specific before ever seeing the
appellant in custody, and was never inconsistent. 98'
Having found that the defendant had not been prejudiced by
the in-court identification in spite of the show-up and the lineup, the court turned next to counsel's contention that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment mandated exclusion
a. "prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act. .. ";
b. "the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-line-up description
[given the police about the suspect] and the defendant's actual appearance
',,

c. any identification prior to the line-up of another person;
d. "the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the line-up
"failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion ... "; and
f. lapse of time between the act and the identification.
195. Id. at 240. Courts have attempted to clarify what is meant by the adjectives
"clear" and "convincing." E.g., In re Jost, 117 Cal. App. 2d 379,383, 256 P.2d 71,74 (1953)
("so clear as to leave no substantial doubt and sufficiently strong to commend the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.").
196. In support of its conclusion that the line-up did not taint the in-court identification, the supreme court cited Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), where the witness
had only a momentary but "real good look" at her attacker in the headlights of a passing
car. 263 S.C. at 378, 210 S.E.2d at 607.
197. As to the innocuous effect of the show-up upon the in-court identification, the
court relied upon United States v. Terry, 422 F.2d 704, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1970), in which the
police were provided a detailed description of the suspect which was based upon a 15minute observation by the prosecutrix in two different well-lighted settings, and upon
United States ex rel. Rutherford v. Deegan, 406 F.2d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 1969), in which the
complaining witness' description of the defendant "tallied perfectly ... except for the
change of clothing and shaving." 263 S.C. at 378, 210 S.E.2d at 607.
198. 263 S.C. at 379, 210 S.E.2d at 607.
e.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss2/6

40

et al.: Criminal Law

1975]

CRIMINAL LAW

of the in-court evidence. The gist of defendant's argument was
that, under Stovall, subjecting a suspect to a show-up in the
absence of a showing that a line-up was not feasible would require
per se exclusion of any in-court identification. 99' While recognizing that Stovall conceivably could lend itself to such an argument,"' Justice Ness noted that it had not been so interpreted by
the courts. He then set forth the standard rationale:
Thus, even when this mode of identification has been employed
at the police station, the "substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification" underlying the due process claim has been
found lacking on the basis of other facts such as here where the
witness had ample opportunity to observe the offender at the
time of the crime and established her ability to recall his features by explaining the same to the officers in detail as heretofore stated. 0 '
199. Because show-ups are basically one-on-one procedures, there is a certain amount
of potential prejudice to the defendant inherent in their use. Upon that basis some experts
have argued that the defendant's assertion is not without merit:
Courts have suggested that identification procedures violative of due process
may be sufficiently isolated for an eyewitness to make an untainted in-court
identification. It is submitted, however, that such a finding is consistent with
the due process clause only in the extreme case. The due process claim is bottomed upon unreasonable police conduct in light of all the surrounding circumstances and the probability that the procedure was so suggestive that an irreparable mistaken identification was made. If the mistake was irreparable, it is
illogical to assume that an eyewitness could make an in-court identification
from his observations at the scene without mental reference to the suggestive
out-of-court identification procedure.
T. ABBOT, J. CRATSLEY, S. ENGLELBERG, D. GROVE, P.
TACTICS IN EXCLUSIONARY HEARINGS 262 (1969).

MANAHAN,

B. SAYPOL, LAW AND

200. In Stovall because of the likelihood of the death of the complaining witness, a
show-up in the hospital was ruled justifiable. 388 U.S. at 302. Thus, one could infer that
a show-up would be illegal, absent similar exigent circumstances, and that any subsequent
in-court identification would be deemed tainted per se.
201. 233 S.C. at 380, 210 S.E.2d at 608. In support of his reasoning, the judge cites
to the case of United States ex rel. Geralds v. Deegan, 292 F. Supp. 968 (S.D. N.Y. 1968),
in which the in-court identifications provided by two witnesses were admitted in spite of
the fact that both witnesses had twice observed the defendant, a black, in show-ups in
which he was either unaccompanied or accompanied only by a white police officer. Because prior to those show-ups the witnesses had described the defendant in detail and
provided information whereby a police artist produced a composite drawing of him, that
court held that there was a source sufficiently independent to support the in-court identification.
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E. Search and Seizure
1. Recent Changes in the Law
In State v. Bell"' the defendant contended that the trial
court had erred in upholding the legality of both his arrest and
the searches of his person and automobile conducted incident
thereto. Relying primarily upon three recent Supreme Court decisions-United States v. Robinson' 3 (by implication), United
States v. Edwards,"4 and Cardwell v. Lewis2 0S-the South Carolina Supreme Court found no error in the trial court's disposition
of those issues and affirmed the defendant's conviction. 200
The overriding concern in determining the legality of a
search made incident to an arrest is the reasonableness of the
search in light of the fourth amendment.2 7 The general criteria

used in making that determination, and thus in establishing reasonableness, evolved as a result of the Supreme Court's endeavor
to strike a balance between the government's need to search and
the intrusion upon one's privacy which a search entails.2

0

Those

criteria are now well-known aspects of the criminal process.
The first requirement which a search incident to arrest must
satisfy is that it be "justified at its inception.

' 29

legal2 0

Simply stated,

this means that, first, the arrest must be
and second, that
the search should be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." ' 2" Prior
202. 263 S.C. 239, 209 S.E.2d 890 (1974).
203. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Robinson established the prevailing rule that a warrantless
search incident to a custodial arrest was a valid exception to the fourth amendment
requirement of the issuance of a warrant prior to the search.
204. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
205. 417 U.S. 583 (1974). Treatment of Robinson, Edwards, and Cardwell will focus
upon the degree to which those cases represent changes to the existing law. The voluminous literature already extant on search and seizure law obviates the need for an extensive
analysis of that subject. Rather than detract from Bell, initial consideration of the Supreme Court cases is intended to provide a contextual background from which the importance of that case may be drawn out.
206. 263 S.C. at 245, 209 S.E.2d at 892.
207. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
208. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967).
209. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20.
210. Were an officer to make an arrest for which he had no warrant or for which he
lacked probable cause to believe either that a felony had been committed or that the
arrested individual had committed the felony, the arrest would be illegal, as well as any
search made incident thereto. In the case of a misdemeanor, an officer's failure to procure
a warrant when the crime had not been committed in his presence or his lack of probable
cause would lead to an identical result. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-252, 253 (1962).
211. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20 (1968).
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to Robinson such a search could be conducted only to accomplish
at least one of two purposes-to discover weapons which. might
be used to effect escape or to harm the police officer and to discover evidence of the crime which might otherwise be concealed
or destroyed.212 The search, however, could not be made as a
matter of course; for in order to justify his actions "the police
officer [had to] be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, ' 21 would lead to the conclusion that the place to be
21 4
searched contained the sought-after weapons or evidence.
The thrust of Robinson is aimed directly at the second requirement; whenever a suspect becomes the subject of a custodial
arrest, the police are thereby relieved from the obligation of having to analyze the circumstances of the arrest in order to determine whether a full search is warranted. 25 The Supreme Court
reasoned that custody in itself is a sufficient circumstance to
make reasonable the scope of intrusion involved in the full
search.2 11 In so finding, the Court noted
It is scarcely open to doubt that the danger to an officer is far
greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the
taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the
police station than in the case of the relatively fleeting contact
resulting from the typical Terry-type stop [wherein a limited
pat-down for weapons is all that the law allows] .217
In Edwards, the Supreme Court further broadened the effect
of a custodial arrest upon the standard of reasonableness as applied to searches of the person. Previously, warrantless searches
had been subject to specific time and space limitations.21 8 The
212. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
213. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21 (1968).
214. If the arrested individual was not to be taken into custody and had committed
a crime for which there could be no evidence, a search would be unwarranted, unless the
officer had reason to believe himself to be endangered. Further, even if the suspect was
to be taken into custody, failing the establishment of a nexus between the crime committed and possible evidence to be found, no search could reasonably ensue, subject, of
course, to the justifiable weapon search. Finally, if belief that the suspect was armed stood
as the sole justification for the search, that search could be no more intrusive than a
limited pat-down for weapons.
215. 414 U.S. at 235.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 234-35.
218. As the dissent in Edwards observed: "the search [should] be spatially
limited to the person of the arrestee and the area within his reach, . . . and must, as to
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majority, however, chose to affirm what has evidently been the
policy of most of the circuit courts." 9 Once an arrestee is taken
into custody, a thorough search of his person and effects is justified regardless of whether the search is conducted contemporaneously with the arrest. The Court concluded that
once the defendant is lawfully arrested and is in custody, the
effects in his possession at the place of detention that were subject to search at the time and place of his arrest may lawfully
be searched and seized without a warrant even though a substantial period of time has elapsed between the arrest and subsequent administrative processing on the one hand and the tak2
ing of property for use as evidence on the other. 1
The effect of custody, then, can only be viewed as abrogating the
requirement of substantial contemporaneity.
The Cardwell majority stated the issue there as being"
whether the examination of an automobile's exteriorupon probable cause invades a right to privacy which the interposition of a
warrant requirement is meant to protect."'2 Noting that the
question was one of first instance 2 2 the Supreme Court concluded that in such a situation, a search of an automobile's exterior without a warrant would not be unreasonable under the
fourth and fourteenth amendments.2 n Because it was the exterior
of the car that was searched and because the car had been left in
a public parking tot, the Court reasoned that there could be no
infringement upon any legitimate expectation of privacy and,
therefore, no warrant was required.22
There can be no doubt that the Supreme Court decisions in
Robinson, Edwards, and Cardwell collectively will greatly aid
other courts in making their determinations as to whether the
time, be 'substantially contemporaneouswith the arrest'." (emphasis added). 415 U.S. at
810 (Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, & Marshall, J.J., dissenting). See also Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
219. 415 U.S. at 807 & n.8 at 808, citing Malone v. Crouse, 380 F.2d 741 (10th Cir.
1967); Hancock v. Nelson, 363 F.2d 249 (1st Cir. 1966); United States v. Caruso, 358 F.2d
184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 862 (1966).
220. 415 U.S. at 807. In Edwards the defendant was not searched until 10 hours after
he was taken into custody. Id. at 810. A question then arises as to how long a substantial
period is, and, therefore, whether there is a length of time which would be greater than
substantial and thereby sufficient to invalidate the search.
221. 417 U.S. at 589 (emphasis added).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 592.
224. Id. at 591.
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fourth amendment's standards are applicable under a particular
set of circumstances. To the extent, however, that these cases
broaden the category of police conduct which may be deemed
reasonable, and therefore allow warrantless searches, they represent an unfortunate erosion in the amount of protection which the
fourth amendment affords the private citizen. The real danger of
these decisions lies in the possibility of their being loosely interpreted, generally applied, and, therefore, continually expanded
by other courts to allow warrantless searches under a variety of
fact situations which may be only superficially akin to the facts
of these three major decisions. State courts, coifsequently, should
be mindful of the need to discuss with specificity the manner in
which each of these cases has been applied if they are considered
as controlling. The Supreme Court of South Carolina's lack of
specificity in the Bell decision is an excellent case in point.
The prosecuting witness in Bell informed police that she had
been raped. In the investigation report she stated that during the
attack her assailant had worn a pair of pantyhose over his head,
and she described with particularity the attacker, his automobile,
and several articles she had noticed in the automobile. About
eight hours later, while on a stake-out for a suspect in another
case, a deputy sheriff observed an automobile fitting the description provided by the victim pass by him at a high rate of speed.
After a short, high-speed chase, he overtook and stopped the car.
At the trial, the deputy testified that the interior of the car was
just as described by the prosecuting witness and that5 the articles
22 1
she had specified were in plain view inside the car.

Rather than making the arrest himself, the officer obtained
the defendant's consent to wait until investigating officers could
be summoned to the scene. At this point in the court's opinion,
it becomes unclear as to when and by whom the articles inside
the car were seized. The opinion is also ambiguous as to when and
by whom the defendant was arrested, stating only that he was
arrested and booked an hour after he had been stopped. 22 61 When

the defendant was required to remove his boots during the booking process, a pair of pantyhose was discovered in his left boot.
The articles seized from the car and the pantyhose were admitted
into evidence over his objection at the trial.
225. 263 S.C. at 243-44, 209 S.E.2d at 891.
226. Id. at 244, 209 S.E. 2d at 891.
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The supreme court affirmed the trial judge's finding that,
under the circumstances, the officers did not need a warrant to
arrest the defendant and that the arrest was based upon probable
cause. The court concluded that since the arrest was reasonable,
and therefore legal, the evidence obtained incident thereto was
227
properly admitted at trial.
Admission of the evidence seized from the defendant's automobile was sustained on two grounds. Relying upon State v.
Daniel,2 8 the court held that since the articles were in plain
view inside the car, no search had been conducted to locate them
and that, as a result, those articles could be legally seized. 2 9 The
ability of this rationale to withstand constitutional scrutiny depends upon the sequence in which the arrest and seizure occurred. It should be noted that the warrant requirement was
designed to protect against unreasonable seizures as well as
searches.' Thus, had the seizure occurred prior to the arrest,
the arrest could not serve to establish, post facto, its legality.
The trial record does not resolve this issue by establishing which
was the first to occur.23
The second ground upon which the court sustained the admission of the evidence was also inadequately explained and,
unfortunately, possibly expansive in scope. Even if the officers'
action did constitute a search, reasoned the court, that search was
legal "under the circumstances." 23 This conclusion was based
2 33
solely upon citations to Cardwell and Katz v. United States.
The unexpressed reasoning of the court seems to be that pursuant
to Katz the defendant had no expectation of pr: -acy as to the area
inside his car which was viewable from the outside.
A very real problem, however, arises in applying Katz and
Cardwell together to the facts of Bell. The only relevant language
in Cardwell cited by the supreme court 234 is a passage taken from
Chambers v. Maroney, 3 5 which stands for the proposition that
once an arrest has been made and probable cause to search is
227. Id.
228. 252 S.C. 591, 167 S.E.2d 621 (1969).
229. 263 S.C. at 244, 209 S.E.2d at 892.
230. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. at 597 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
231. Record at 68-95. This issue was not raised at trial nor in the appellants' brief.
232. 263 S.C. at 244, 209 S.E.2d at 892.
233. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The South Carolina Supreme Court specifically cites page
351 of the Katz opinion, although that case does not mention the "under the circumstances" language.
234. 417 U.S. at 590.
235. 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
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present, an automobile stopped on a public highway, and thus
susceptible to being moved, may be searched without a warrant.
Had the supreme court relied upon Chambers, rather than
Cardwell, its conclusion would have been much more meaningful.
Application of the Cardwell rationale to the search of the
automobile's interior in Bell was clearly inappropriate. At one
point in Cardwell the United States Supreme Court stated:
"Again, we are not confronted with any issue as to the propriety
of a search of a car's interior." ' And in a subsequent footnote, it
intimated that searches of other areas of an automobile entailed
additional considerations not present in a search of its exterior.2In upholding the legality of the search of the defendant's
person in Bell, the South Carolina Supreme Court relied entirely
upon Edwards. Again, no more than a conclusion of law was
given. The court stated only that the pantyhose were clearly admissible as the product of "a search incident to a custodial arrest.12 3 Had the issue been whether a full search of an arrested
individual's person could be justified purely on the basis of his
custodial arrest, Robinson would govern its disposition, insofar as
it is precisely to that point that Robinson is directed.2 39 Edwards,
on the other hand, focuses on the timing of the search and thus
2
on whether the search actually was incidental to the arrest. 1
Although Bell is unclear as to when the arrest did occur, the trial
record indicates that the arrest occurred at the time defendant
was being detained on the highway.2 41 As a result, there must have
been at least a short time lag between his arrest and the search
of his person. Reliance upon Edwards would resolve any potential
problems which may have arisen had the "substantial contemporaneity"2 2 standard been argued by the defendant's counsel.
Insofar as neither party, however, made reference to Edwards in
their appellate briefs, 4 3 one can do no more than speculate as to
the court's reasons for relying upon that case.
236. 417 U.S. at 592 n.8.
237. Id. at 593 n.9.
238. 263 S.C. at 245, 209 S.E.2d at 892.
239. 414 U.S. at 224; see notes 215-17 supra and accompanying text.
240. See notes 218-21 supra and accompanying text.
241. Record at 94.
242. See note 218 supra and accompanying text.
243. Because the brief for the state cited Robinson as explicit authority for the search
of defendant's person and because the defendant did not make an issue of the contemporaneity of the search, the court's reliance upon Edwards becomes even more mystifying.
Brief for Respondent at 6.
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The Bell decision exemplifies the need for state superior
courts to use greater care in their use of controlling authority,
especially when dealing with search and seizure issues, by elaborating more fully upon the facts of the specific case and by strictly
tailoring their statements to those facts in order to better explain
their reasoning for such an interpretation; to do otherwise will
only promote the misinterpretation of their general statements by
lower courts which may eventually lead to a notable increase in
warrantless searches upheld under the guise of "reasonable under
the circumstances" jargon, thereby continuing the erosion of the
constitutional protection provided to individuals by the fourth
amendment.
2. Fruits of the Poisonous Tree
In State v. Matarazzo" the defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance-marijuana-with intent to distribute. On a Friday night police officers entered the defendant's
trailer home under authority of a search warrant which later
proved defective. At the time of entry, a party comprised of ten
to twelve participants was in progress. The defendant was not
home. During the ensuing search, four bags of marijuana were
found-one in the room in which the party had occurred and
three in a bathroom. At the same time, two individuals who occupied the trailer home with the defendant were arrested. The defendant was arrested and charged some time thereafter.245
At trial the three bags of marijuana found in the bathroom
were suppressed as fruits of an illegal search and seizure. The
state, however, was permitted to establish possession by way of
the oral testimony of the defendant's two roommates, who had
pleaded guilty some time prior to the trial. Counsel for the defendant objected to the testimony of the first roommate24 on the
ground that to admit such testimony would effectively "defeat
the entire purpose of the exclusionary rule."2 47 The trial court

overruled that objection holding "that the invalidity of the search
244. 262 S.C. 662, 207 S.E.2d 93 (1974).
245. The court's opinion does not specify when or where the defendant was arrested.
246. Defense counsel failed to preserve his objection when he proceeded to crossexamine the witness without first requesting the court to allow him to do so while reserving
his objection. Counsel also failed to object to the testimony of the second witness. 262 S.C.
at 669, 207 S.E.2d at 97.
247. Id.
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warrant would not prevent the State from proving through an
independent source, if it could, the quantity of marijuana in the
premises at the time." 4 '
On appeal the defendant contended that such testimony was
fruit of the poisonous tree and, therefore, inadmissible. Noting
that such a contention "was never made to nor passed upon by
the court below," 249 the supreme court, nevertheless, saw fit to
comment on the issue. In dicta, the court made a short comment
upon the legal principles involved, stating in conclusion that
"the record [was] insufficient to support [the defendant's] . . .
2
contention." °
The decision reached by the supreme court in Matarazzo to
deny the defendant's appeal was undoubtably a correct one since
his counsel had failed to properly preserve his objections, but the
court's brief discussion, in dicta, of the fruit of the poisonous tree
issue does not lend itself to such a clear-cut resolution as that
which is suggested. Evidence collected by illegal means is not
inaccessible to the state if it may likewise be arrived at by an
independent source.2 51 The usual test for determining whether an
alternative source is sufficiently independent to support admission of the evidence is that mandated by the United States Su2
preme Court in Wong Sun v. United States:n
[Evidence is not] "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because
it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the
police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is "whether
• . .the evidence to which instant objection is made has been
come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
'
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."
The South Carolina Supreme Court reasoned that the testimony was a sufficiently independent source because there was
"considerable evidence against [the roommate] other than any
marijuana found as the result of an invalid search warrant, [and
because] the record does not show, exactly why he decided to
. . .testify for the State.12 4 Nonetheless, an innovative counsel
248. Id. at 670, 207 S.E.2d at 97. The quoted language was assumed by the supreme
court to be the basis upon which the trial court ruled.
249. Id. at 669, 207 S.E.2d at 97.
250. Id. at 670, 207 S.E.2d at 97.
251. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
252. 371 U.S. 484 (1963).
253. Id. at 488.
254. State v. Matarazzo, 262 S.C. at 670, 207 S.E.2d at 97.
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might have successfully argued that the evidence was not sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint since the
state's witness' testimony was directly related to the fact that had
the witness not known of the police discovery of the illegally
seized marijuana, he would not have testified to the defendant's
possession; nor would the police have thought to question the
witness about the marijuana had it not been discovered. Either
or both possibilities could constitute an impermissible exploitation of the illegal search and seizure. 56
F. Statements of Counsel
The general rule on statements by the prosecution to the
effect that its evidence is uncontradicted is that such statements
will not be interpreted as references to the defendant's failure to
testify, and thus as grounds for reversal, unless the defendant can
demonstrate that he was the only one who could contradict that
evidence. 21 Some courts, however, have broadened the rule in the
defendant's favor by not allowing similar commentary which contains direct references to the defendant, 258 or which is repeatedly
255. From the record it appears that the witness' testimony was the only other "considerable evidence" against the defendant; therefore, if counsel could show that the witness' testimony was directly related to and had been obtained by exploitation of the
illegally obtained evidence, there would be no evidence by which the defendant could be
charged with the crime.
256. Based, as they are, upon logic, arguments such as this one are not without
limitations. Even though a causal connection between the evidence obtained and the
primary illegality may be shown, "[a]s a matter of good sense, however, such connection
may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 341 (1939). Thus the burden is upon the defendant to impress upon the trial
judge the solidity of his argument.
257. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 401 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1968); Padgett v. State,
223 So.2d 597 (Ala. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 223 So.2d 603 (Ala. 1969); People v. Jacoboni,
34 Mich. App. 84, 190 N.W.2d 720 (1971).
258. See, e.g., Holden v. United States, 388 F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1968); Hoff v. State,
83 Miss. 488, 35 So. 950 (1904); White v. State, 127 Tex. Crim. 547, 78 S.W.2d 195 (1935).
The prosecution will not usually make direct reference to the defendant but will refer to
the defendant by implication. As was stated by the First Circuit:
The reference in the instant case to defendant's failure to testify was veiled
but in the context it was obvious who was expected to contradict Mrs. Ricker.
This is not a situation where the contradiction could come from more than one
source. Realistically, it would have to come from the defendant or it was not
likely to come at all.
Holder v. United States, 388 F.2d 240, 242 (1st Cir. 1968). The court in Holder went on,
though, to allow such commentary when counsel for the defense did not immediately
object (but waited until the recess after summation to the jury), and the judge did correct
the error, although not sua sponte in his charge to the jury. Id. at 242-43.
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made, 259 such circumstances giving rise to the presumption that

only defendant could adequately contradict and thereby removing his burden of proving that fact.
During his trial for assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, the defendant in State v. Rouse20 elected not to
take the stand. The solicitor in his closing argument to the jury
stated: "As I stated earlier it is uncontradicted what happened
in that store that day.

'28'

Defense counsel thereupon moved for a

mistrial, and the judge's subsequent denial of the motion became
one of the grounds for appeal.
In finding no error below, the supreme court stated:
The argument in question, however, did not constitute a comment on appellant's failure to testify. Appellant's defense was
alibi. The comment did not state that it was uncontradicted as
to what appellant did on the occasion in question. Rather the
statement referred to what actually took place. As to those

events, the testimony was uncontradicted. The controverted
issue before the jury was whether appellant was present and did
what the uncontradicted testimony showed was done. No argument was made that appellant's participation
in the events was
2- 2
shown by uncontradicted testimony.

Had the comment actually emphasized by the court been the only
one of similar impact, the result in Rouse, though perhaps overly
semantic and restrictive, would have been logically correct. The
record, however, reflects that the solicitor made at least one other
such statement: "Now, the defense in the case as to what occurred on [the date and place of the offense] is . . . [pause]
259. See, e.g., United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1971); People v.
Acker, 127 Ill. App. 2d 283, 262 N.E.2d 247 (1970). The First Circuit, since the Flannery
decision, has limited this allowance of reference to the defendant (even if he alone could
contradict the evidence) to a single exception. That exception is when "the court interrupts the argument, instructs the jury fully on tlie defendant's constitutional right not to
testify and the jury's obligation not to draw unfavorable inferences and in addition, states
to the jury that the U.S. Attorney was guilty of misconduct. . . ." 451 F.2d 880, 882 (1st
Cir. 1971) (emphasis added). The court in Flanneryreaffirmed its belief that the "government would not make such a comment, thereby risking reversal, unless it thought the
comment effective," and it recognized that prosecutors were continuing to make implied
reference to the defendant despite admonitions by the trial judges as well as by justices
of the First Circuit. Id. In any event, it appears that prosecutors will continue to run the
risk of reversal if the benefits of effective comment outweigh that risk.
260. 262 S.C. 581, 206 S.E.2d 873 (1974).
261. Id. at 584, 206 S.E.2d at 874.
262. Id. at 585, 206 S.E.2d at 874 (emphasis added).
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: . . the facts are uncontradicted.12 1 3 It would not stretch the
imagination to conclude that a reasonable juror might comprehend that statement to mean, "Now the defense in the case as to
what occurred on [the date and place of the offense] is, [alibi,
but] the facts [that he was at the store] are uncontradicted.' "
Viewed in such a light and because it is a settled proposition of
law that counsel may never make statements in the presence of
the jury which are not warranted by the evidence,264 the unconsidered statement may have resulted in prejudice to the defendant,
thereby justifying a new trial.
Moreover, that statement, it could have been argued, did
refer to the defendant's activities, reaching beyond reference to
' to include
"what actually took place,"265
"whether appellant was
present.

'266

To the extent that it was a reference to the defendant,

27
it could be considered commentary on his failure to testify. 1
Finally, since counsel preserved objections to the two previously

mentioned comments26 and perhaps three others, 269 the repeated

nature of such commentary supports the inference.210 Unfortunately, these arguments were not articulated in a manner requiring
resolution by the supreme court.2 1
G. Trial
1. The Right to a Speedy Trial
In State v. Monroe272 the defendant appealed from the trial
court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment brought
263. Record at 152.
264. See, e.g., Foster v. Commonwealth, 415 S.W.2d 373 (Ky.), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
914 (1967); Moss v. State, 492 P.2d 1307 (Nev. 1972).
265. See text accompanying note 262 supra.
266. Id.
267. Courts adhering to "the reference to the defendant" exception usually require a
clear, direct reference. E.g., People v. Alexander, 17 Mich. App. 497, 169 N.W.2d 652
(1969); State v. McCleave, 256 S.W. 814 (Mo. 1923). But see Hoff v. State, 83 Miss. 488,
35 So. 950 (1904) ("No living soul has denied .
.
268. Record at 151-54.
269. Brief for Appellant at 12.
270. See text accompanying notes 258-59 supra.
271. In South Carolina there is no requirement that closing arguments be made a part
of the record; counsel may, however, upon request to the court, secure such an inclusion.
Because of the dangers which inhere in closing arguments, counsel should, pro forma,
make the necessary request. For a good exposition of the problems involved and authority
for the cure, see South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Meredith, 241 S.C. 306, 128
S.E.2d 179 (1962).
272. 262 S.C. 346, 204 S.E.2d 433 (1974).
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against him for escape. While serving an 8-year sentence, 73 he
absconded from a county road gang to New Jersey, where he
remained at large for approximately I year and 10 months. One
month and 23 days after his arrest in New Jersey, he was returned
to South Carolina. Forty-nine days later the defendant demanded
trial but was not tried and convicted until 7 months had elapsed.
He grounded his appeal on the 1965 Interstate Agreement on
Detainers Act (section 17-221 of the South Carolina Code of
Laws)2 4 and on the denial by the state of his constitutional right
to a speedy trial.275 The supreme court determined the defendant's first ground of appeal to be wholly without merit because
no interstate detainer had been issued. It is to the court's disposition of the second ground that attention here is focused.
276
The right to a speedy trial is rooted in the Magna Charta,
and the reasons for it have been enumerated on several occasions
by the United States Supreme Court. 27 7 Those reasons, summarized in United States v. Ewell, 25 are "to prevent undue and
oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and
concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to
273. The defendant was sentenced to six years for robbery and to a consecutive 2year sentence for. resisting an officer.
274. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-221(a) (Cum.Supp. 1974) reads in applicable part:
Article M
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or
correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance
of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any
untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer
has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one
hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting
officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written
notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to
be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good
cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the
appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the
time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole
agency relating to the prisoner. (emphasis in original).
275. See S. C. CONsT. art. 1, § 18 and U. S. CONsT. amends. VI, XIV.
276. Cf. Klopper v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-41 (1967).
277. See, e.g., Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 37-38 (1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S.
374, 377-79 (1969); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
278. 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
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defend himself." 279 Because of the nature of the right and the evils
it is intended to prevent, the only remedy for its infringement2 is0
dismissal of the indictment and reversal of the conviction.

Thus, it is for the courts to determine whether a deprivation of
the right has actually occurred.
In embarking upon this determination, the South Carolina
Supreme Court noted that "[a] speedy trial does not mean an
immediate one; it simply means a trial without unreasonable and
unnecessary delay."2 ' The reasonableness and necessity of the
delay are to be determined "in the light of the circumstances of
[the particular] case.

' 282

In deciding whether the circumstances

of Monroe warranted reversal, the court considered four factors
suggested by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v.
Wingo 3 for making the determination.
The Length of the Delay. Obviously, if there is no delay,
consideration of the other three factors becomes unnecessary.
"Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy
trial, the length of delay that will provoke.

. .

inquiry [into the

other three factors] is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar
circumstances of the case.

28 4

Ostensibly, the supreme court

found that the 81/2 month delay which occurred in Monroe was
sufficiently long to warrant consideration of the other factors,
although it was not sufficient to warrant reversal in and of itself.
The Reason for the Delay. The court determined that the
279. Id. at 210.
280. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972). The first two evils to be prevented
through preservation of the right to a speedy trial have been held to be the most invidious
and to constitute prejudicial effects which may arise from denial of the right; therefore,
their presence obviates the need to show actual prejudice in the fact-finding process. See
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 (1971). As to the final evil, however, a defendant must demonstrate that the delay has made it impossible for him to defend himself.
Such a situation normally occurs when key witnesses die or become unavailable or when
evidence is lost, destroyed, or otherwise unobtainable. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. at 40.
In determining whether one or more of the dangers is sufficiently present to mandate
reversal, courts must necessarily engage in a balancing process between the rights of the
defendant and the right of public justice. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905). Once
sufficient prejudice to weigh the balance in favor of the defendant is indicated, reversal
becomes the only possible remedy. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 523.
281. 262 S.C. at 349-50, 204 S.E.2d at 435. For precedent the court cites the reader
to Wheeler v. State, 247 S.C.I393, 400, 147 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1966).
282. 262 S.C. at 349, 204 S.E.2d at 435.
283. 407 U.S. at 530. The Supreme Court suggested that the following factors be
considered: "Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his
right, and prejudice to the defendant."
284. Id. at 530-31.
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state's reason for delay was not so patently frivolous as to warrant
reversal. 15 The solicitor's office made a strong showing that during the delay it was hampered by an immense case load and that
it was diligently striving to reduce the same. The supreme court
concluded that, whereas such a reason could not excuse an inordinate delay, it was sufficient to excuse the delay in Monroe,"6
there being "[n]othing in the circumstances [which] would
'27
suggest that [the defendant] was entitled to priority. 1
The Defendant's Assertion of His Right. The failure by a
defendant to make a timely demand for trial in some instances
may detract from the merits of his appeal. Although the United
States Supreme Court expressly held that such a failure should
not result in automatic denial of a defendant's claim, it is, nonetheless, a relevant consideration in its overall evaluation. 2 s The
South Carolina Supreme Court found that since the defendant's
claim in Monroe was sufficient to provide notice to the prosecutor, the fact that it was partially brought upon an incorrect statute would not detract from the merit of his appeal.
Prejudiceto the Defendant. The fact that a person is already
imprisoned during the delay does not eradicate the oppressive
effects that may attend that delay. In Smith v. Hooey,8 9 the
United States Supreme Court noted that oppressiveness might be
occasioned:
[When] the possibility that the defendant already in prison
might receive a sentence at least partially concurrent with the
one he is serving [is] forever lost [because] trial of the pending
charge is postponed [and when] the duration of his present
imprisonment may be increased, and the conditions under
285. The court's conclusion receives support from the United States Supreme Court
in Dickey v. Florida. There, delays occasioned by the state were analyzed as follows:

"Crowded dockets, are lack of judges or lawyers, and other factors no doubt make some
delays inevitable . . . . [H]owever, no valid reason for [a] delay [exists when brought
about] exclusively for the convenience of the State." 398 U.S. at 38.
286. In most instances, delays caused by overcrowded dockets will not be sufficient
to outweigh the right to public justice and thus to require reversal. As the South Carolina
Supreme Court concluded, however, it would be unjust to excuse an inordinate delay on
such a basis because, as the United States Supreme Court has noted, "the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the
defendant." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531.
287. 262 S.C. at 350, 204 S.E.2d at 435.
288. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 524-30.
289. 393 U.S. 374.
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which he must serve his sentence greatly worsened [due to] the
pendency of another criminal charge outstanding against him.,"
The South Carolina Supreme Court considered these sources and
determined that the defendant had not been oppressed. First, it
found that the trial court had the opportunity to consider, and
summarily rejected, the imposition of a concurrentsentence, and
second, that because a consecutive sentence had been imposed,
the duration of the defendant's imprisonment would not be
lengthened by the delay in disposing of the escape charge after
his return to custody. Beyond the absence of oppressiveness, the
court also found that delay had not impaired the defendant's
ability to defend against the escape charge. As the supreme court
2
noted, the defendant "neither had nor attempted any defense.1 1
As a result, it would necessarily follow that he could not suffer
prejudice from the unavailability of defense witnesses or of other
evidence. In conclusion, it appears that the supreme court's analysis of the defendant's contentions was a full, adequate, and fair
one and, thus, that the denial of his appeal was entirely justified.
2.

Notice and Opportunity to Defend

In State v. Prince92 the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled
that a period of 2 days between the time of arrest and the time
of trial constituted "ample notice and opportunity to answer and
defend""29 against the charge of driving while under the influence
and, as such, comported with the requirements of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The defendant had been
arrested early Sunday morning and was released from jail approximately 9 hours after his arrest. Prior to release, he was served
with a summons and arrest report requiring him to appear for
trial in magistrates court on the following Tuesday afternoon.
Upon his failure to appear at the specified date and time, he was
tried and found guilty as charged. Two days later the defendant
served notice of appeal in the circuit court, alleging, among other
things, that setting the trial date 2 days after arrest constituted
a per se 214 violation of procedural due process. In agreeing with
290. Id. at 378.
291. 262 S.C. at 350, 204 S.E.2d at 435.
292. 262 S.C. 89, 202 S.E.2d 645 (1974).
293. Id. at 91, 202 S.E.2d at 648.
294. The usual connotation given to the term "per se" within the facts of Prince
would be that regardless of the circumstances or any actual prejudice to the defendant, a
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defendant's allegation and granting a new trial, the circuit court
held: "[D]ue process requires, in a case of the seriousness of
driving under the influence, at the very least a minimum period
for appearance and entry of plea of seven calendar days." '95
In reversing the circuit court, the supreme court restated the
generally recognized rule that due process does not mandate a
particular lapse of time between arrest and trial." 6 Rather, the
setting of the trial date lies within the discretion of the trial
court.297 Exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed by a
superior court unless it appears from all the facts and
circumstances of a particular case that the defendant had not
been afforded reasonable time to prepare for trial.298 Since the
defendant-chose to rely on the argument that the 2-day differential was a per se violation of due process rather than attempting
to demonstrate prejudice to his particular case resulting from the
set trial date and thereupon applying for a continuance, 299 the
supreme court had no choice but to reverse the circuit court and
reinstate the conviction.
The result in Prince seems unjust for obvious reasons;"9 nevertheless, the supreme court undoubtedly reached the proper resolution of the issue. It should be noted that other jurisdictions
have, by statute or rule of practice, established minimal time
periods between arrest and trial, thereby affording their citizenry
protection from the prejudicial effects caused by inadequate time
2-day time span between arrest and trial would necessarily constitute a denial of due
process. See BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 1294 (4th ed. 1968).
295. Record at 3.
296. See generally 22A C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 478 (1961).
297. Although the point has never been directly decided in South Carolina, the state's
appellate brief points out that the discretionary powers of trial courts have been discussed
in cases concerning the denial of a request for continuance. In State v. Christensen, 194
S.C. 131, 137, 9 S.E.2d 555, 558 (1940), it is stated that the defendant "can be required
to go to trial at such time [as] the court directs;" and in State v. Griffin, 98 S.C. 105, 82
S.E. 254 (1914), it is stated that "there was no evidence that the trial court abused its
discretion by not allowing a continuance" where trial had been set two days after indictment. Brief for Appellant at 3-4.
298. 53 Am.JuR. Trials § 12 (1945).
299. In most jurisdictions failure to apply for a continuance or otherwise make a
timely objection to the setting of a trial date constitutes a waiver of the right to a reasonable time to prepare for trial. See, e.g., State v. Simon, 126 S.C. 437, 120 S.E. 230 (1923).
300. The circuit court judge specifically mentioned the following reasons: "[Tihe
severeness of the penalty, additional time needed 'to sober up further or rest up from the
experience of jail confinement', the layman's lack of knowledge of how to secure advice of
counsel." Record at 4, State v. Prince, 262 S.C. 89, 202 S.E.2d 645 (1974).
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allowed by the court for the preparation of the defendant's case.3
If our state judiciary does not take steps shortly to establish such
minimal time periods by rule of practice, legislative action in this
area might be both appropriate and beneficial in establishing a
more equitable system of justice.
II.
A.

SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

Illegal Electronic Surveillance

In United States v. Burroughs,321 the United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina, Judge Hemphill presiding, made one of the first judicial determinations of the scope of
Section 801(a) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
301. In South Carolina a defendant must be granted three days between the time of
arraignment and trial in capital cases, if he so demands. See State v. Floyd, 174 S.C. 288,
177 S.E. 375 (1934). For mandatory time periods in other jurisdictions see cases collected
under 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 478, nn. 62-64 (1961).
302. 379 F. Supp. 736 (D.S.C. 1974), appeal dismissed, 510 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1975).
The government appealed Judge Hemphill's acquittal n.o.v.; however, in an unpublished
opinion, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding, in effect, that the double
jeopardy clause precludes such an appeal when, as in Burroughs, it is grounded upon
claimed statutory misinterpretation which is "merely the foundation of [the court's]
decision on the facts," and not purely a ruling of law. United States v. Burroughs, No.
74-2018 at 5 (4th Cir., Feb. 4, 1975) (emphasis in original). The court concluded that
"unlike an order dismissing an indictment or an order arresting judgment, a final judgment of acquittal explicitly based upon the evidence presented at trial is not properly
appealable by the government to this court." Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning would now be held to exaggerate the breadth of the
double jeopardy clause. In the very recent case of United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332,
352-53 (1975), the Supreme Court held that "when a judge rules in favor of the defendant
after a verdict of guilty has been entered by the trier of fact, the Government may appeal
from that ruling without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause." In so holding, the
Court apparently accepted the government's contention that since the double jeopardy
clause "is intended solely to protect against exposing the defendant to multiple trials" and
"[s]ince a new trial would not be necessary where the trier of fact return[ed] a verdict
of guilty," appeals from adverse post-verdict rulings should be permitted. Id. at 335-36.
Moreover, whether such rulings are labelled acquittals should not control disposition of
an appeal. Id. at 336-39.
Under the foregoing reasoning, then, it would appear that the Fourth Circuit was
legally empowered to consider the government's appeal.
If [defendant] prevails on appeal, the matter [would] become final, and the
Government [would] not be permitted to bring a second prosecution against
him for the same offense. If he loses, the case [would] go back to the District
Court for disposition of his remaining motions.
Id. at 353. Thus, had the Fourth Circuit entertained the appeal, only two results could
have ensued-affirmation of the acquittal or reinstatement of the verdict; defendants'
rights under the double jeopardy clause would not have been endangered.
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Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) .31 That provision constitutes
a broad proscription of the interception of wire and oral communications. 0 4 The controlling issue presented to the court was
whether section 2511(1)(a) may be applied to the unauthorized
interception of oral communications by private persons not acting
under color of state law.
The defendants in Burroughs were management employees
of a large southeastern textile corporation. The complaining witnesses were organizers for the Textile Workers Union of America.
One of the defendants, after gaining the motel owner's less-thanenthusiastic permission to do so,30 5 placed a multi-directional
microphone in the receiver of a telephone located in a motel room
being utilized by the organizers as an operational center for union
activities. Placement of the microphone in the telephone rendered it useless as a telephone instrument. 6 The microphone,
however, was of a type which would function whether or not the
telephone was off the hook.30 1 Upon complaints by the organizers
303. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1970) [hereinafter cited as § 2511(1)(a) or subsection
(a)]:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who(a) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire or oral
communication ...
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
304. Interception of wire communications refers to what is commonly termed "wiretapping." Interception of oral communications is more commonly referred to as "bugging"
or "eavesdropping." The difference between the two types of interception exists in the
manner in which the communication is picked up. Usually, in wiretapping, a communication is intercepted at some point between the place of origin and the place of destination.
Interception is accomplished by attaching a device to the wire along which the communication travels. Hence, the definition of wire communication provided in the act:
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1970):
(1) "wire communication" means any communication made in whole or
in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by
the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and
the point of reception furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common
carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate
or foreign communications.
Bugging, on the other hand, involves the direct interception of sound from the source.
Such interception is accomplished by the use of microphones or similar devices which pick
up the sound and transmit it to a receiver some distance away. The Act provides the
following definition:
18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1970):
(2) "oral communication" means any oral communication uttered by a
person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation. . ..
305. Brief for Appellant at 3.
306. Id. at 5.
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that their phone was out of order, an employee of the telephone
company removed it and replaced it with another." 8 The listening
device was discovered after inspection of the original telephone
and, evidently, reported to union officials. This information
prompted the union to complain to the FBI, thereby giving rise
to the charges brought against the defendants.
At trial the jury returned a verdict finding both defendants
guilty of violating section 2511(1)(a) as charged in the information. The defendants thereupon made a motion for acquittal, or
in the alternative, for a new trial. The motion was based, inter
alia, upon the fact that the government had failed to prove state
action as a necessary element of the offense. For the reasons set
forth below, the court concluded that section 2511(1) (a) could not
be constitutionally applied to purely private action and, thus,
that the motion for acquittal must be granted.
The judge based his resolution of the issue upon the following
analysis. Initially, he observed that section 2511(1) (a) applies to
wiretapping in all situations. Since the definition of wire communication provided in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) 311 clearly demonstrates
the requisite connection of wire-tapping with interstate commerce, he reasoned that Congress's plenary power to regulate all
such activity had been plainly established. In regard to the applicability of section 2511(1) (a) to the interception of oral communications, however, he found no language in the definition of such
communications3 '° from which congressional power to regulate
private action might be expressly or impliedly inferred. That definition is couched in terms of existing case law which define the
311
individual's constitutional right to privacy in this context.
Since the federal government is empowered to protect that right
against other than federal interference solely by the fourteenth
amendment, the judge concluded that proof of a nexus to state
action was a necessary element to conviction under section
2511(1)(a) as it applies to oral communications.
In support of his conclusion, Judge Hemphill cited the existence of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b) 32 and certain excerpts from the
308. Id.
309. See note 304 supra.
310. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2)(1970); see note 304 supra.
311. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967).
312. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b) (1970) [hereinafter cited as § 2511(1)(b) or subsection

(1)(b)]:
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legislative history of the Act.3" 3 Section 2511(1)(b) offers five specific categories of situations in which any person who intercepts
an oral communication without authorization may be held criminally liable. In each category there is a specific reference to an
"accepted jurisdictional [basis] under the commerce clause
[or] other [provision] of the Constitution [which would allow
' 34
Congress] to prohibit the interception of oral communication. 1
The existence of section 2511(1)(b), so the argument ran, evidences the intent of Congress that section 2511(1)(a) should not
be applied to purely private action. If this was not the case and
since the broad prohibition of section 2511(1)(a) would clearly
apply in every case in which section 2511(1)(b) applies, "sub31 5 Judge Hemphill,
section (1) (b) would be useless legislation.1
therefore, would not allow himself to "indulge in the presumption that Congress would enact redundant and unnecessary legis36
lation."
Unfortunately, however, such a facile, and seemingly logical,
analysis may not accurately represent legislative intent nor comport with constitutional law. First, the legislative history more
(1)

Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who-

(b) willfully uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or
endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral

communication when (i)

such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal

through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or
(ii)

such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes

with the transmission of such communication; or
(iii)

such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or

any component thereof has been sent through the mail or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce; or

(iv) such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of
any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which
affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose
of obtaining information relating to the operations of any business or
other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate

or foreign commerce; or
(v)

such person acts in the District of Columbia, the Common-

wealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or possession of the United
States....

shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
313. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112-2309 (90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1968).

[hereinafter cited as the Legislative History or the Senate Report].
314. Id. at 2180.

315. United States v. Burroughs, 379 F. Supp. at 741 (emphasis in original).
316. Id.
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clearly supports an interpretation at odds with that of the court.
Second, in view of that interpretation, section 2511(1)(b), while
arguably redundant, does not constitute "useless" legislation.
Third, there is constitutional support for a broad congressional
prohibition of private "bugging."
Legislative History. The backbone of the court's analysis is
a long excerpt" ' from the Senate Report to the Act. In summary,
it is stated that where the power to regulate wiretapping, as
founded upon the commerce clause, is established, such power is
less clearly mandated in the case of oral communications. There
is clear authority, however, under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to regulate certain types of unofficial conduct (presumably that done under color of state law) and state
action. Nonetheless, the report recognizes the possibility that
purely private action may be immune from proscription under
the Act. As a result, some constitutional challenges may be
averted by including "a clear statutory specification of an alternative constitutional basis for the prohibition." Consequently,
subsection (b) was included in the Act "in addition to the broad
prohibitions of subsection (a)." 3 '
317. Id. at 741-42.
318. See Legislative History 2180-81:
Subparagraph (a) establishes a blanket prohibition: against the interception of
any wire communication. Since the facilities used to transmit wire communications form part of the interstate or foreign communications network, Congress
has plenary power under the commerce clause to prohibit all interception of
such communications, whether by wiretapping or otherwise. (Weiss v. United
States, 60 S.Ct. 269, 308 U.S. 321 (1939)).
The broad prohibition of subparagraph (a) is also applicable to the interception of oral communications. The interception of such communications, however, does not necessarily interfere with the interstate or foreign communications network, and the extent of the constitutional power of Congress to prohibit
such interception is less clear than in the case of interception of wire communications. The Supreme Court has indicated that Congress has broad power to
protect certain rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th amendment
against private interference. (United States v. Guest, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 383 U.S.
745 (1966) (concurring and dissenting opinions).) The right here at stake - the
right of privacy - is a right arising under certain provisions of the Bill of Rights
and the due process clause of the 14th amendment. Although the broad prohibitions of subparagraph (a) could, for example, be constitutionally applied to the
unlawful interception of oral communications by persons acting under color of
State or Federal law, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 384 U.S. 641
(1966), the application of the paragraph to other circumstances could in some
cases lead to a constitutional challenge that can be avoided by a clear statutory
specification of an alternative constitutional basis for the prohibition.
Therefore, in addition to the broad prohibitions of subparagraph (a), the
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Two concepts become immediately apparent from the Senate language. The first is that the Congress is, as yet, uncertain
as to the breadth of its powers under the commerce clause" 9 and
the fourteenth amendment."' And the second is that, because of
that uncertainty, it wanted to insure that, at least in some instances, private interference with oral communications could be proscribed without the fear of constitutional attack."' Thus, it seems
that Conress enacted subsection (b) because it was not willing to
gamble on total reliance upon subsection (a) .2
Neither the wording of subsection (a) nor the Senate Report
contain any statements raising an unequivocal inference that
that subsection was to be limited to state action. In fact, under
the express language of subsection (a), "any person" found to
have violated its provisions may be held liable.3 11 Further, the
Senate Report is replete with references to congressional abhorrence of all unauthorized electronic surveillance, regardless of the
committee has included subparagraph (b), which relies on accepted jurisdictional bases under the commerce clause and other provisions of the Constitution
to prohibit the interception of oral communications.
Subparagraph (i) prohibits any interception through the use of a device
linked in any way to the interstate or foreign network of wire communications.
Under this provision, for example, the use of leased or other telephone lines to
transmit signals intercepted by eavesdropping devices is prohibited. The use of
such lines in the past has greatly extended the range of eavesdropping devices,
since the devices can be made useful in circumstances where intercepted conversations cannot be conveniently monitored from adjacent premises, but must be
transmitted to a more distant location.
319. In the legislative history it is stated that "the extent of the constitutional power
of Congress [under the Commerce Clause] to prohibit [interception of oral communications] is less clear than in the case of interception of wire communications." Legislative
History at 2180.
320. See note 321 infra.
321. Cf. Legislative History at 2180 (emphasis added):
The right here at stake - the right of privacy - is a right arising under certain
provisions of the Bill of Rights and the due process clause of the 14th amendment. Although the broad prohibitions of subparagraph (a) could, for example,
be constitutionally applied to the unlawful interception of oral communications
by persons acting under color of State or Federal law, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the application of the paragraph to other
circumstances could in some cases lead to a constitutional challenge that can
be avoided by a clear statutory specification of an alternative constitutional
basis for the prohibition.
322. Therefore, in addition to the broad prohibitions of subparagraph (a),
the committee has included subparagraph (b), which relies on accepted jurisdictional bases under the commerce clause and other provisions of the Constitution
to prohibit the interception of oral communications.
Id. (emphasis added).
323. See note 303 supra.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1975

63

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

context in which it occurs.2 4 In such a light, the judge's conclusion that subsection (b) was intended to stand in lieu of subsection (a) in the area of private interception of oral communications
seems incorrect.
The Utility of Section 2511(1)(b). From the preceeding discussion it should be clear that subsection (b) is not a useless
provision. Its utility is derived from the fact that it details specific
situations where congressional power to regulate is so clearly
demonstrable that violations of that subsection may be prosecuted without fear of time-consuming and expensive constitutional challenges. 25 Thus, in many situations it will be unnecessary to rely upon the constitutionally "shaky" subsection (a).
There is also evidence, however, of a congressional realization
that subsection (b) would not be applicable to every type of conduct sought to be proscribed.32 While the factual situation in
Burroughs appears to come within several of the specific situations. set forth in subsection (b),3 2 there may have been evidentiary problems not evident from a reading of the case that pre324. The tremendous scientific and technological developments that have
taken place in the last century have made possible today the widespread use
and abuse of electronic surveillance techniques. As a result of these developments, privacy of communication is seriously jeopardized by these techniques
of surveillance. Commerical and employer-labor espionage is becoming widespread. It is becoming increasingly difficult to conduct business meetings in
private. Trade secrets are betrayed. Labor and management plans are revealed.
No longer is it possible, in short, for each man to retreat into his home and be
left alone. Every spoken word relating to each man's personal, marital, religious,
political, or commercial concerns can be intercepted by an unseen auditor and
turned against the speaker to the auditor's advantage.
Legislative History at 2154.
325. See notes 321-22 supra.
326. Cf. Legislative History at 2181 (emphasis added):
Taken together, subparagraphs (i) to (v) of subparagraph (b) create an essentially comprehensive ban on the interception of oral communications. The provisions will be applicable to the overwhelming majority of cases involving the
unlawful interception of such communications, and it will be unnecessary to rely
on the broader prohibition of subparagraph (a).
327. The case was originally brought under section 2511(1)(b)(i) and dismissed. It is
surprising that the amended complaint was then brought under section 2511(1)(a) rather
than section 2511(1)(b)(iii) or (iv). It would seem that under subsection (b)(iii) a prima
facie case could easily be made out that the microphone or its component parts moved in
interstate commerce. It is highly improbable that such a sophisticated electronic device
could be manufactured locally. It should have been possible to have made an even stronger
case under subsection (b)(iv). Even if the motel did not qualify as an interstate establishment under the Heart of Atlanta holding (infra note 332), which is unlikely, the alleged
purpose of the wiretaps was to collect information about an attempt to organize a union
in a manufacturing plant that was surely within the scope of the commerce clause.
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vented prosecution under that subsection. Nonetheless, the form
of espionage which occurred surely was no less insidious than it
would have been had the subsection (b) nexus been established.
Consequently, it does not seem unreasonable to infer that when
such unique situations arise, Congress would be content to rely
upon subsection (a) in spite of the uncertainty as to its authority
to enact such a broad provision.
ConstitutionalSupport. That Congress was aware of the ex-

istence, though perhaps not the breadth, of its power under the
commerce clause to regulate private "bugging" on a broad basis
is made clear in the Senate Report:
[Subsection (a)] recognizes that intercepting devices are being
used by certain segments of our society to overhear private oral
conversations. It then notes that the contents of these communications are used by persons whose activities affect interstate
commerce and that the possession, manufacture, distribution,
by interstate
advertising,and use of these devices arefacilitated
3 2s
commerce. Compare Wickard v. Fillburn.
The citation to Wickard v. Fillburn3 25 is of particular interest.

That case and its progeny demonstrate that Congress's power
under the commerce clause knows few limitations 330 and that it
is clear that Congress may regulate a class of activities affecting
interstate commerce with no requirement that in each instance a
specific nexus be demonstrated. 33 Once Congress has determined
that certain activities affect interstate commerce, it has plenary
power to regulate that conduct.
Even though a particular instance of unauthorized appropriation of an oral communication by a private person may have no
demonstrable effect on interstate commerce, all such occurrences, when viewed as a class of activities, may have profound
adverse effects. All that is required of Congress to proscribe such
activities is that it establish a rational basis for its belief that the
conduct affects interstate commerce and that the measures
adopted be a reasonable means of regulation. 332 Thus, the court's

conclusion in Burroughs that the broad provision embodied in
328.
329.
330.
U.S. 294
331.
332.

Legislative History at 2177 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
E.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1970); Katzenbach v. McLung, 379
(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
Cf. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. at 154.
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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subsection (a) is without constitutional foundation when applied
to purely private interception of oral communications seems to be
unfounded.
In conclusion, fairness requires recognition of the fact that
Judge Hemphill was confronted in Burroughs with the obligation
of having to make a very difficult choice. On the one hand, if he
had permitted the jury verdict to stand, he would have affirmed,
in essence, the fact that congressional power under the commerce
clause is virtually unlimited. Such a reality certainly has its unsettling and alarming aspects. By over-turning the verdict and
setting the defendants free, however, he has vitiated a provision
which was intended to enable the government to provide protection against a more insidious and immediate threat to the sovereignty of the individual.
B.

Murder

In State v. Speights333 the defendant was convicted of the
murder 33 of his brother-in-law. After his arrest and upon being
advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona,315 he provided the
police with his full confession to the murder. On appeal, he contended that he was entitled, as a matter of law, to a directed
verdict on the ground that the state had failed to prove the fundamental facts necessary to sustain a conviction for murder. Specifically, he alleged that the only competent evidence available to
the state was his confession and that he could not be convicted
solely on it without sufficient corroborating proof of the corpus
3 36
delicti.
In order to meet its burden of proof, the state was required
to establish the death of the victim and the criminal act of the
defendant causing that death. 337 Although direct evidence of
those elements is the most desirable, it is not essential.3 The
burden may be carried by presumptive or circumstantial evi333. 263 S.C. 127, 208 S.E.2d 43 (1974).
334. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11 (Cum. Supp. 1973): "Certain crimes classified as
felonies. - The crimes referred to in the following sections of this code, to wit: [section]
16-51 (murder) . . . are hereby classified as and declared to be felonies."
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-41 (1962): "Murder defined. - "Murder" is the killing of any
person with malice aforethought, either express or implied."
335. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
336. See State v. McIver, 238 S.C. 401, 120 S.E.2d 393 (1961); State v. Teal, 225 S.C.
472, 82 S.E.2d 787 (1954); State v. Blocker, 205 S.C. 303, 31 S.E.2d 908 (1944).
337. State v. Collington, 259 S.C. 446, 192 S.E.2d 852 (1972).
338. Id.
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dence when that type of evidence is the best obtainable. 39 Since

the state had provided corroborating evidence, the defendant's
attack disputed the sufficiency thereof to corroborate his confession.
In upholding the trial court's conclusion that the state had
met its burden, the supreme court found that the additional evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient and suggested
that the defendant's assertion of error was based upon a misconstrual of the standard by which that sufficiency is determined.,"
To meet its burden as to the first element of the corpus delicti,
the state presented the testimony of the examining pathologist.
The substance of that testimony detailed the manner and time
of the deceased's death. In corroboration of that portion of the
defendant's confession in which he admitted shooting the victim,
his wife testified as to occurrences which precipitated the murder
and as to the defendant's oral admission to her that he had shot
the deceased. The supreme court saw no need to look for further
corroboration. In consideration of a motion for a directed verdict,
a trial judge need not find, as the defendant contended, that a
confession be corroborated beyond a reasonable doubt by circumstantial evidence. That quantum of proof is applicable only to a
jury in its final resolution of the guilt-innocence issue. In explaining and differentiating the two standards, the supreme court
cited the following language from State v. Littlejohn:4"
It must be remembered, too, that there is one test by which
circumstantial evidence is to be measured by the jury in its
deliberations, and quite another by which it is to be measured
by the trial judge in his consideration of the accused's motion
for a directed verdict. As to the former, it is necessary that every
circumstance relied upon by the state be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and that all of the circumstances so proven be
consistent with each other and, taken together, point conclusively to the guilt of the accused to the exclusion of every other
reasonable hypothesis .

. .

. But on a motion for direction of

verdict, the trial judge is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not with its weight; and, although he should
not refuse to grant the motion where the evidence merely raises
a suspicion that the accused is guilty, it is his duty to submit
339. Id.
340. 263 S.C. at 131, 208 S.E.2d at 45.
341. 228 S.C. 324, 89 S.E.2d 924 (1955).
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the case to the jury if there be any substantial evidence which
reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, or from which
his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced. 2
C. Driving Under the Influence-Reck less Driving
In State v. Fennell313 the supreme court held that the lesser
offense of reckless driving3" is not included within the offense of
driving under the influence.3 5 The defendant was arrested for,
and tried upon, the charge of driving under the influence. The
jury returned with a divided verdict and a mistrial was declared.
On the same day, the magistrate accepted the defendant's guilty
plea to reckless driving, in lieu of retrial on the greater charge.
Still later in the same day, the magistrate wrote the defendant a
letter stating that he had been in error in accepting her guilty plea
and that a date for retrial would be set. From that action the
defendant appealed to the circuit court which ruled, in effect,
that the magistrate had not erred in accepting the plea and that
the state was foreclosed from further prosecution of the driving
under the influence charge. The state appealed from the circuit
court's order.
In reversing the circuit court, the supreme court noted that
in order for one offense to be included within another, it must be
demonstrated that the more serious offense includes all the necessary legal and factual elements of the lesser offense or that the
lesser offense be an element of the greater. 311 The statutory definitions of the two offenses considered in Fennell would not support
either finding.34 The court's conclusion is a logical one in that the
lesser offense of reckless driving refers to the manner in which an
automobile is operated rather than to the condition of the
operator or impairment of driving ability as a result thereof.
342. Id. at 328, 89 S.E.2d at 926.

343. 263 S.C. 216, 209 S.E.2d 433 (1974).
344. Under S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-342 (1962), it is provided that "[a]ny person who
drives any vehicle in such a manner as to indicate either a wilful or wanton disregard for
the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving."
345. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-343 (1962): "It is unlawful for... any person who is under
the influence of intoxicating liquors ... to drive any vehicle within this state."
346. See generally 42 C.J.S. Indictment and Information § 286 (1961); 41 Aas. JUR.
2d Indictment and Information § 313 (1968).
347. The court cited numerous cases in which other jurisdictions have arrived at the
same conclusion. See, e.g., Peterson v. Jacobson, 2 Ariz. App. 593, 411 P.2d 31 (1966);
People v. Clenney, 165 Cal.App.2d 241, 331 P.2d 696 (1958); People v. Byrne, 65 Misc. 2d
174, 317 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1970).
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D. Possession of Drugs
1.

The Elements of Possession

Ellis34 8

State v.
was a complicated case involving four
defendants, each of whom was arrested and charged on two
counts-the first being for the possession of heroin for sale and
distribution in violation of section 32-1510.49311 of the South Carolina Code of Laws and the second for the possession of dangerous
drugs without having obtained the same upon a prescription of a
duly licensed physician in violation of section 56-1313(4). 311 The
348. 263 S.C. 12, 207 S.E.2d 408 (1974).
349. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1510.49 (Cum. Supp. 1973):
Prohibited acts A; penalties. - (a) Except as authorized by this article, it
shall be unlawful for any person:
(1) To manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance;
(2) To create, distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or
dispense, a counterfeit substance. Any person who violates this subsection with
respect to:
(1) A substance classified in Schedules I or II which is a narcotic drug
under § 32-1510.31 (b) and (c) or lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) shall be
deemed guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall for a first offense be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not more than fifteen years or a fine of
not more than twenty-five thousand dollars, or both. For a second offense, or if,
in the case of a first conviction of violation of any provision of this subsection,
the offender shall previously have been convicted of any violation of the laws of
the United States or of any state, territory, or district relating to narcotic drugs,
the offender shall be imprisoned for not less than five years nor more than thirty
years, or fined not more than fifty thousand dollars or both. For a third or
subsequent offense, or if the offender shall previously have been convicted two
or more times in the aggregate of any violation of the laws of the United States
or of any state, territory or district relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drugs, the offender shall be imprisoned for
not less than fifteen years nor more than thirty years, or fined not more than
fifty thousand dollars, or both. Except in the case of conviction for a first offense
the sentence shall not be suspended and probation shall not be granted.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1510.31 (Cum. Supp. 1973):
Schedule I. - (a) The controlled substances listed in this section are included
in Schedule I.
(c)

Any of the following opium derivatives.

.

10. Heroin.
350. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1313(4) (Cum. Supp. 1973):
§56-1313. Certain drugs to be sold only on prescriptions. - It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, give away, barter, exchange, distribute or possess in
the State, except on a prescription of a duly licensed physician, medical or
osteopathic, dentist or veterinarian:
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building searched contained an upstairs and downstairs apartment, the former being occupied by defendants Scott and Bryan
and the latter by defendants Ellis and Gregory. The heroin was
discovered in a guestroom in the Ellis-Gregory apartment and the
dangerous drugs in the Scott-Bryan apartment. Evidence presented at the trial revealed that Bryan stored the heroin downstairs but made numerous sales in his own apartment. During the
trial Gregory and Ellis were granted a directed verdict as to count
two. The jury found Ellis guilty as to count one and apparently
acquitted Gregory. Bryan and Scott were convicted on both
counts, the trial court denying Scott's motion for a directed verdict on count one. Ellis and Scott appealed their convictions for
the possession of heroin for sale and distribution under count one.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the judgment
as to Scott and affirmed as to Ellis. In reaching its decision the
court set forth the elements of the two types of possession which
give rise to criminal liability. When the person charged with possession is found to have actual physical custody over the illegal
drugs, he has actual possession thereof 3 1 As the court noted,
however, possession may also be inferred from the circumstances.
Therefore, whenever a person has dominion or control over either
the drugs or the premises in which they are located, it may be said
that that person has constructive possession over those drugs.

2

In other words, possession of the drugs or premises gives rise to
an inference that the person charged has both the power and
intent to control the disposition and use of the drugs, and this
inference "may be sufficient to carry the case to the jury on a
' Mere presence of
charge of unlawful possession."353
a person in an
area where illegal drugs are found is not enough, in and of itself,
to give rise to the necessary inference." 4
(4) Hormones, synthetic or natural, antifat preparations to include thyroid, thyroxin or such other drugs as are declared dangerous by the Federal Food
and Drug Administration and which are, in the discretion of the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners classified as "dangerous drugs" within the meaning of

this section.
351. For discussion of actual and constructive possession the court cites the reader
to State v. Perry, 10 Wash. App. 159, 516 P.2d 1104 (1973). See also 22A C.J.S. Criminal
Law § 597 (1961).

352. See note 351 supra.
353. 263 S.C. at 22, 207 S.E.2d at 413. In corroboration of its analysis the court cites

State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 187 S.E.2d 706 (1972). See also cases collected under Annot.,
91 A.L.R.2d 810 (1963).
354. State v. Tabory, 260 S.C. 355, 196 S.E.2d 111 (1973).
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Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, the
supreme court found that the evidence was sufficient to sustain
the conviction of Ellis. Specifically, because a large quantity of
heroin was found in her apartment and because she admitted to
being, at least twice a week, in the room in which those drugs
were found, a jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable
doubt that she had constructive possession. The court, however,
could not find sufficient evidence to convict Scott. The heroin
was not stored in her apartment, and the mere fact that Bryan
was making sales there, without other evidence, was insufficient
to sustain a verdict of guilty of possession.
2.

Proof by Extrinsic Evidence

3 55 demonstrates with finality the ease by
State v. Matarazzo
which the offense of possession of drugs may be proven. The
defendant appealed from his conviction of the possession of four
bags of marihuana-one of which was legally seized incident to
an arrest, the other three being products of a search made pursuant to a defective search warrant. All four bags were found in
a trailer home which the defendant shared with two others. Defendant was found guilty, even though he was at work and not
present in the trailer at the time of the search. In the court's view,
the fact that the defendant lived in the trailer and testimony to
the effect that he knew of the presence of the marijuana there
sufficiently established the required elements of constructive possession.
Matarazzo reveals that at the same time more than one person can be in possession of a drug 5 ' and that production of the
contraband material is not a necessary element to proof of the
offense. 5 The one legally seized bag of marijuana was produced
from the Chime358 area near one of the defendant's roommates at
the time of his arrest. Thus, the defendant had possession by
virtue of his dominion and control over the premises, and his
roommate was found to have possession because of the proximity
of the marijuana to him at the time of his arrest. Proof of posses355. 262 S.C. 662, 207 S.E.2d 93 (1974).
356. Accord, Folk v. State, 11 Md. App. 508, 275 A.2d 184 (1971); Ritter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 173 S.E.2d 799 (1970).
357. The three bags of marijuana seized under the authority of the defective Learch
warrant were suppressed at trial. 262 S.C. at 667-68, 207 S.E.2d at 95-96.
358. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The authorities may search the immediate area within the control of an arrested individual. Id. at 762-63.
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sion of the three bags of marijuana seized at trial was established
by testimony of the two roommates, who had previously pleaded
guilty to the same offense. Since the state did not introduce
scientific evidence as to the nature and amount of the substance
contained in those three bags, 359 the defendant possibly could
have successfully objected to the admission of any and all evidence concerning material, the contraband nature of which had
not been proven.
E. Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature
1. Compared to Simple Assault
In South Carolina the crime of assault and battery of a high
and aggravated nature is a common law offense. As such, it has
been defined as
[a]n unlawful act of violent injury to the person of another,
accompanied by circumstances of aggravation, such as the use
of a deadly weapon, the infliction of serious bodily injury, the
intent to commit a felony, conditions of the parties, a difference
in the sexes, indecent liberties or familiarities with a female, the
purposeful infliction of shame and disgrace, resistance of lawful
authority, and others.1
Simple assault and battery, on the other hand, "is an unlawful
act of violent injury to the person of another, unaccompanied by
any circumstances of aggravation."36 ' Under the indictment for
the greater offense, a presiding judge need not submit the question of simple assault and battery to the jury "unless there is
testimony tending to show that the defendant is only guilty of a
' In 1974 two cases came before the
simple assault and battery."362
supreme court in which defendants were convicted of assault and
battery of a high and aggravated nature after their requests for
jury instructions on the lesser offense had been denied by the trial
judge. The court reversed and remanded for new trial in the first
and affirmed conviction in the second.
359. The state unsuccessfully attempted to introduce testimony of a chemist as to
the "approximate weight of four packages of marijuana similar to the one package which
was in evidence." 262 S.C. at 670, 207 S.E.2d at 97.
360. See, e.g., State v. Hollman, 245 S.C. 362, 140 S.E.2d 597 (1965); State v. Self,
225 S.C. 267, 82 S.E.2d 63 (1954).
361. State v. DeBerry, 250 S.C. 314, 157 S.E.2d 637 (1967).
362. State v. Hollman, 245 S.C. 362, 364, 140 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1965).
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In State v. Wiggins363 the codefendant and the complaining
witness were involved in a fight in which the complaining witness
clearly was maintaining the upper hand. The defendantappellant became involved only in an effort to free his friend and
codefendant and to remove him to safety. No contention was
made that the appellant had struck the prosecuting witness or
had otherwise injured him. Rather, the state's case was based
upon the theory that the appellant had aided and abetted the
codefendant in inflicting the aggravated injury. The supreme
court remanded for a new trial, finding that there was testimony
from which the jury could have found the appellant guilty of
simple assault and battery. In so concluding, the court reasoned:
It is inferable from the record . . . that after the difficulty between the codefendant and the prosecuting witness began, appellant became involved only in an effort to protect his codefendant and remove him to safety; and that in doing so, any physical contact with the prosecuting witness was slight and without
any intent to do him bodily harm. These circumstances required
that the trial judge also submit to the jury the issue as to appellant's guilt of the lesser offense of simple assault and battery.
The failure to do so requires that a new trial be granted."4
2.

Constitutionalityof the Offense

3 5 the defendant was convicted of agIn State v. Carpenter
gravated assault and battery upon a police officer. The physical
confrontation occurred when the officer attempted to effect the
defendant's departure from a restaurant upon the request of a
waitress toward whom the defendant had used vulgar language.
After being told to leave the premises, the defendant directed
vulgar language toward the officer and thereupon was informed
that he was under arrest. There was testimony tending to show
that the prosecuting witness was in full police uniform and that
the defendant had struck the officer numerous times about the
head, causing bruises and abrasions. The defendant contended
that his actions were taken in self-defense, in that he was not
aware that the prosecuting witness was a policeman nor that he
was under arrest and in that the officer had attacked him first.
Other testimony adduced at trial indicated that other patrons of
363. 262 S.C. 517, 205 S.E.2d 833 (1974).
364. Id. at 520, 205 S.E.2d at 834.
365. 262 S.C. 401, 205 S.E.2d 141 (1974).
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the restaurant had struck the police officer.
The majority of the supreme court refused to remand for new
trial, finding that there were clear circumstances of aggravation
which made it proper for the trial judge to refuse to charge simple
assault and battery. Although the text of the opinion seems to
indicate that the serious bodily injuries suffered by the prosecuting witness constituted the required aggravating circumstances,
there is some language pointing to the defendant's resistance of
arrest as an element of the offense.366 In any case, the majority
concluded that there was no testimony tending to show that there
were no circumstances of aggravation and, thus, that defendant
was only guilty of simple assault and battery.
Proceeding upon the theory that the majority had relied
upon the serious bodily harm inflicted upon the officer, Justice
Bussey sought to dispute their finding that there was no testimony tending to show that the defendant had been guilty only of
the lesser offense. 6 Because the complaining witness, by his own
admission, had received blows from others than the defendant,
Justice Bussey reasoned that the jury could have concluded that
the defendant had not inflicted the requisite amount of harm
required to sustain a verdict of guilty of assault and battery of a
high and aggravated nature. After noting that the phrase "serious
bodily injury" has not been accorded precise definition by the
South Carolina Supreme Court, he reasoned further that in his
mind and according to the most common definition used in other
jurisdictions,36 a jury question existed as to whether the injuries
inflicted were of a nature serious enough to warrant conviction
under the more serious offense.
By expanding upon Justice Bussey's reasoning one step fur366. At one point in the opinion the court stated that there "can be no doubt here
that the policeman received serious bodily harm as a result of being struck numerous times
by the appellant." At a subsequent place in the same paragraph, however, the court
concluded:
If the officer was acting properly and the arrest was lawful ...
the acts of the
appellant made out all of the elements of an aggravated assault and battery
because the officer received serious bodily injury as a result of the appellant's
resistance to lawful arrest by constituted authority.
262 S.C. at 406, 205 S.E.2d at 143 (emphasis added).
367. 262 S.C. at 407-09, 205 S.E.2d at 143-44 (Bussey, J., dissenting).

368. The judge cites the reader to 38A WOADS AND PHRASES Serious Bodily Harm or
Injury 450 (1967) and cases collected thereunder in which the term has been defined as
"such an injury as gives rise to apprehension of danger of life, health, or limb." 262 S.C.
at 408, 205 S.E.2d at 144.
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ther, it may be possible to argue that the provision under which
the defendant was convicted, as applied, is unconstitutionally
vague and, as such, operates to deny to a person convicted thereunder the due process of the law to which he is entitled under
the fourteenth amendment. Although the offense of assault and
battery of a high and aggravated nature derives its origin from the
common law of this state, its status as a criminal misdemeanor
is established under section 16-12 of the Code of Laws.369 As a
result, the common law definition logically should be subject to
the due process requirements applied to criminal statutes. The
United States Supreme Court has invalidated criminal statutes
because they fail "to give adequate guidance to those who would
be law-abiding, to advise defendants of the nature of the offense
with which they are charged, or to guide courts in trying those
who are accused."37 In expanding that reasoning in another case,
the Supreme Court ruled: "There must be ascertainable standards of guilt. . . . The vagueness may be. . . in regard to the
' As a result, a criminal statapplicable tests to ascertain guilt."371
ute will be held unconstitutional when it is found to be "so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.13 2 It has also been held,
however, that a vague statute may be cured through the medium
of reasonable judicial construction.7 Those constitutional inadequacies, therefore, which may exist in the quasi-legislative
provision of concern here may be remedied through the simple
expedient of providing a judicial interpretation to the words "se3 74
rious bodily injury.
369. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-12 (1962): "All other criminal offenses [not referred to in
§ 16-11] punishable under the laws of this State are hereby classified as and declared to
be misdemeanors. .. "
370. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1948).
371. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1948).
372. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
373. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
374. Of course, there remains a possibility that the words "serious bodily injury" do
contain the requisite degree of certainty. See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972),
in which the Supreme Court stated:
The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness. It is not a principle
designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in
drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of
human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain
kinds of conduct are prohibited.
375. 263 S.C. 275, 210 S.E.2d 228 (1974).
376. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-353 (Cum. Supp. 1973):
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F. Attempted Misdemeanors
In State v. Totherow375 the defendant was convicted of attempted larceny. The supreme court reversed the conviction on
the ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict
of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. More noteworthy than the
reversal, however, was Justice Bussey's discussion of the offense
itself. Since the defendant was charged with attempting to steal
an item worth less than 50 dollars, had he been successful and
then apprehended, the charge would have been petit larceny-a
misdemeanor under section 16-353311 of the South Carolina Code
of Laws. It was noted that in all probability an attempt to commit
a misdemeanor is not an indictable offense in South Carolina.
Only once has the South Carolina Supreme Court confronted
the issue directly. In State v. Redman37 7 a three-to-two majority
of the court reversed an appellant's conviction for attempting to
obtain goods under false pretenses, finding it elementary that
such an offense was not indictable precisely because it was an
attempt to commit a misdemeanor.378 Since the present court was
not called upon to decide the issue, Redman was mentioned only
in passing and without comment as to its probably efficacy.
Petit larceny. -

Any simple larceny of any article of goods, choses in action,

bank bills, bills receivable, chattels, or other article of personalty of which by
law larceny may be committed or of any such fixture or part or product of the
soil as was severed from the soil by an unlawful act, of the value of less than
fifty dollars, shall be triable in the magistrate's court and the punishment shall
be not more than is permitted by law without presentment or indictment by the
grand jury.
377. 121 S.C. 139, 113 S.E. 467 (1922).
378. The reasoning of the dissent in Redman seems to be more persuasive. First, it
correctly recognizes that the rule espoused by the majority was not the general rule as it
existed then (nor is it now). Secondly, then, as now, those jurisdictions following such a
rule did so only in the case of statutory misdemeanors and not those which were malum
in se. 121 S.C. at 140, 113 S.E. at 467 (Cothran, J., dissenting); accord, 22 C.J.S. Criminal

Law § 74 (1961).
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